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THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE AND 
INHERENT PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
David Gray Adler1 
The historic American debate on the nature and scope of 
executive authority, punctuated and dramatized by the re-
nowned eighteenth-century exchange between James Madison 
and Alexander Hamilton/ and spiked in our time by sweeping 
assertions of unilateral presidential power in foreign affairs and 
warmaking/ and by claims of privilege, secrecy and immunity in 
I. Professor of Political Science, Idaho State University. This article is drawn 
from a forthcoming book, The Steel Seizure Case and Presidential Power (U. Press of 
Kansas, 2003). 
2. The debate on the nature and scope of executive power has been canvassed by a 
vast and growing body of literature that defies illustration in a footnote, but see, for ex-
ample, Thomas E. Cronin and Michael A. Genovese, The Paradoxes of the American 
Presidency (Oxford U. Press, 1998); Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Inventing the American 
Presidency (U. Press of Kansas, 1989); Louis Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between 
Congress and the President, (U. Press of Kansas, 4th ed. 1997); Louis Fisher, Presidential 
War Power (U. Press of Kansas, 1995); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Imperial Presi-
dency (Houghton Mifflin Co., 1973); Theodore J. Lowi, The Personal President: Power 
Invested Promise Unfulfilled (Cornell U. Press, 1985); Forrest McDonald, The American 
Presidency: An Intellectual History (U. Press of Kansas, 1994); Donald L. Robinson, "To 
the Best of My Ability" The Presidency and the Constitution (W.W. Norton & Co., 1987); 
Richard M. Pious, The American Presidency (Basic Books, Inc., 1979); Michael A. Geno-
vese, Presidential Powers (Oxford U. Press, 2000); Mark J. Rozell, Executive Privilege: 
The Dilemma of Secrecy and Accountability (The Johns Hopkins U. Press, 1994); Robert 
J. Spitzer, President and Congress: Executive Hegemony at the Crossroads of American 
Government (Temple U. Press, 1993); David Gray Adler and Larry N. George, eds., The 
Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (U. Press of Kansas, 1996) 
3. These subjects have been examined and re-examined in an extensive literature. 
See, e.g., Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President (cited in 
note 2), Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (cited in note 2) and Adler and George, 
eds., The Constitution and the Conduct of American Foreign Policy (cited in note 2); 
Francis D. Wormuth and Edwin B. Firmage with Francis P. Butler, contributing author, 
To Chain the Dog of War: The War Power of Congress In Hisotry and Law (Southern 
Methodist U. Press, 1986); John Hart Ely, War and Responsibility (Princeton U. Press, 
1993); Harold Koh, The National Security Constitution (Yale U. Press, 1990); Michael J. 
Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy (Princeton U. Press, 1990); Edward Keynes, Unde-
clared War: Twilight Zone of Constitutional Power (Pennsylvania State U. Press, 1982); 
David Gray Adler, The Constitution and Presidential Warmaking: The Enduring Debate, 
103 Pol. Sci. Q. 1 (1988); Louis Fisher and David Gray Adler, The War Powers Resolu-
tion: Time to Say Goodbye, 113 Pol. Sci. Q. 1 (1998); Adler, The The Law: Clinton The-
ory of the War Power, 30 Presidential Studies Q. 155 (2000); Alexander DeConde, Presi-
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domestic matters,4 took center stage once more in the extraordi-
nary case of Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.5 Justly 
celebrated in the pages of this volume, on the occasion of its 50th 
anniversary, for its landmark status and deserving rank in the 
pantheon of great cases-alongside Marbury,6 McCulloch/ and 
Brown8- Youngstown has been assured of immortality in the 
annals of constitutional jurisprudence. The Steel Seizure Case, 
like the Pentagon Papers Case9 and the Watergate Tapes Case, 10 
was suffused with richly-textured historic dimensions. More-
over, it triggered high political drama and pitched conflict, gen-
erated great tides of public opinion, and plunged the Supreme 
Court into a white-hot cauldron of decision-making responsibil-
ity in which it faced issues of surpassing importance to the na-
tion, including the fundamental question of the president's 
power, if any, to meet an emergency in the absence of statutory 
authorization. When measured against Youngstown, C. Herman 
Pritchett observed, "all other [separation of powers] cases pale 
into insignificance. ,ll Youngstown featured the most thorough 
judicial exploration of presidential powers in the history of the 
Republic,1 and it constituted the most significant judicial com-
dential Machismo (Northeastern U. Press, 2000); Louis Henkin, Constitutionalism, De-
mocracy, and Foreign Affairs (Columbia U. Press, 1990); Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs 
and the United States Constitution (Clarendon U. Press, 2d ed. 1996). 
4. See, e.g. Raoul Berger, Executive Privilege: A Constitutional Myth (Harvard U. 
Press, 1974); Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency (cited in note 2) and Rozell, Executive 
Privilege: The Dilemma of Secrecy and Accountability (cited in note 2). For a discussion 
of these issues as they arose in the Clinton administration, see David Gray Adler and 
Michael A. Genovese, eds. The Presidency and the Law: The Clinton Legacy (U. Press of 
Kansas, 2002). 
5. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
6. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
8. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
9. N.Y. Times Co. v. United Scates, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
10. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974). 
I I. C. Herman Pritchett, Civil Liberties and the Vinson Court 206 (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1954). Robert Banks rightly observed that Youngstown "will jut out among the 
landmarks of constitutional law." Robert F. Banks, Steel, Sawyer, and the Executive 
Power, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 467,536 (1953). 
12. Among contemporaneous commentaries noting the Court's extended discussion 
of executive power see, e.g., Banks, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. (cited in note 11); Paul Kauper, 
The Steel Seizure Case: Congress, the President and the Supreme Coun, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 
141 (1952); EdwardS. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 
Colum. L. Rev. 53 (1953); Lucius Wilmerding, Jr., The President and the Law, 67 Pol. Sci. 
Q. 321 (1952), and Donald R. Richberg, The Steel Seizure Cases, 38 Va. L. Rev. 713 
(1952). For more recent, and extended treatments of the case, see two excellent books: 
Maeva Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power 
(Duke U. Press, 1994); and Alan F. Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case: 
Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The MacMillan Co., 1958). 
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mentary in the 20th century on the limits of those powers. 13 In-
deed, it represented "one of the rare occasions when the Court 
has rebuked a presidential act in wartime." 14 Perhaps it is best 
remembered, as Justice John Paul Stevens declared in Clinton v. 
Jones, as "the most dramatic example" of the Court's authority 
to review the legality of an executive action,15 for in the end it 
"struck a blow for the separation of powers" and reaffirmed the 
principle of presidential subordination to the rule of law. 16 
It is doubtful that even the most prescient of soothsayers 
could have foreseen the emergence of a landmark case-a case 
that would eclipse all other separation of powers cases-in 
President Truman's announcement on April 8, 1952 that he had 
issued that day Executive Order No. 10340 directing Secretary of 
Commerce Charles Sawyer to seize the steel industry for the 
purpose of averting a nationwide strike, which he feared would 
jeopardize the United States' prosecution of its military efforts 
in the Korean War as well as other foreign policy and national 
security interests in Europe. 17 Chief Justice William H. 
Rehnquist, who at the time served as a clerk to Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, has observed that "the case had something of an 0. 
Henry ending about it. "18 He wrote: 
Using the traditional methods of predicting in advance how a 
court will decide a case, the result reached by the Supreme 
13. Chief Justice Rehnquist has said of "the famous Steel Seizure Case": "For those 
of you who have come later than I into the legal profession, I am sure the case simply 
represents one of several important judicial milestones defining the limits of the power of 
a President of the United States to act on his own, without congressional authorization." 
William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 751, 
752 (1986). The only Supreme Court decision that rivals Youngstown's depth of analysis 
of presidential power is United States v. Curtiss- Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), 
but that opinion is confined to a discussion of presidential power in foreign affairs. 
14. Louis Fisher, Foreword, in Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at ix 
(cited in note 12). Fisher added: "To that extent it stands as a warning to occupants of 
the Oval Office that their actions are subject to judicial scrutiny and control." Id. 
15. Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681,703 (1997). 
16. Maeva Marcus noted: "The Supreme Court, by invalidating an act of the Presi-
dent, helped redress the balance of power among the three branches of government and 
breathed new life into the proposition that the President, like every other citizen, is 'un-
der the law."' Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 228 (cited in note 12). Ber-
nard Schwartz observed that U.S. Courts had been reluctant to review presidential acts 
and wrote that this reluctance stemmed from a "perverted construction of the separation 
of powers." Schwartz, Inherent Executive Power and the Steel Seizure Case: A Landmark 
in American Constitutional Law, 30 Can. Bar Rev. 466,478 (1952). 
17. See Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 569, 571-72 
(D.D.C. 1952) for a description of the substance of Executive Order 10340. For a 
broader discussion see Marcus, Truman and the Steel Seizure Case at 58-82 (cited in note 
12). 
18. Rehnquist, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. at 753 (cited in note 13). 
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Court of the United States in the Steel Seizure Case was con-
trary to what one would have expected at the time the lawsuit 
was instituted. There were good reasons, amply supported by 
precedent, why the Court need never have reached the consti-
tutional question in the case. If the Court were to reach the 
constitutional question, precedent did not dictate one answer 
in preference to another. The Supreme Court consisted of 
nine Justices appointed by two Democratic Presidents, re-
viewing a challenge to the actions of President Truman, him-
self a Democrat, who had appointed four of the nine justices. 
The Supreme Court has a commendable record of eschewing 
partisan politics in its decision making, but in a constitution-
ally uncharted area such as this, one might have at least 
thought that a tie would count for the runner, the runner be-
. p "d T t9 mg rest ent ruman. 
In a national radio and television address, President Tru-
man grounded his seizure order in the authority vested in him by 
"the Constitution and laws of the United States, and as President 
of the United States and Commander in Chief of the armed 
forces."20 Despite his reference to the laws of the United States, 
Truman acted without statutory authority. In fact, on the very 
next day, Assistant Attorney General Holmes Baldridge as-
serted in federal court in response to the steel companies' mo-
tion for a temporary restraining order, that the seizure was based 
upon "the inherent executive powers of the President"21 and not 
on any statute. Throughout the subsequent legal proceedings, 
the Administration continued to adduce what it variously re-
ferred to as the president's "emergency," "inherent," or "resid-
ual" powers. Indeed, on April 18, Truman held a press confer-
ence for members of the Society of Newspaper Editors. The New 
York Times ran a story on the conference in which it reported 
the president's response to a reporter's question: 
If it is proper under your inherent powers to seize the steel 
mills, can you, in your opinion, seize the newspapers and the 
radio stations? 
19. Id. (citation omitted). For a broader discussion of the case, from his vantage 
point as a law clerk see William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It Was, How It 
Is (William Morrow and Co., 1987). 
20. Executive Order 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139, 3141 (Apr. 10, 1952). Apparently, 
Truman ignored the views of his "top advisors" who doubted there was any "sound legal 
basis" for seizing the steel industry. N.Y. Times 10E, col. 5 (April 6, 1952), quoted in 
Westin, The Anatomy of a Constitutional Law Case at 7 (cited in note 12). 
21. Transcript of Record, Steel Seizure Case 253. 
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Mr. Truman replied that under similar circumstances the 
President had to do whatever he believed was best for the 
country. 
159 
The President refused to elaborate. But White House 
sources said the President's point was that he had power in an 
emergency, to take over "any portion of the business community 
acting to jeopardize all the people. "22 
The Administration's theory of an inherent power was re-
buked by the judiciary. Federal District Court Judge David A. 
Pine declared the seizure invalid and stated that he found noth-
ing in the Constitution to support the assertion of an undefined, 
inherent power in the presidency?3 The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 
vote, affirmed Judge Pine's ruling, and while there were five 
concurring opinions, Justice Hugo Black's opinion for the Court 
also rejected the claim of an inherent emergency power.24 
The explanation behind Youngstown's stature is not to be 
found in Oliver Wendell Holmes' famous maxim that "[g]reat 
cases like hard cases make bad law."25 On the contrary, the 
Court's repudiation of President Harry Truman's claim of an in-
herent power to seize the steel mills spoke volumes for its com-
mitment to constitutionalism and the principle of the rule of law. 
Nor is it to be found in Professor Gerald Gunther's generally 
sound observation that the "lasting impact [of the Court] ulti-
mately turns on the persuasiveness of the reasons it articulates, 
not on the particular result it reaches,"26 for it is nevertheless 
true that the celebration of Youngstown is as much a reflection 
of the Court's panoramic survey of presidential power as it is a 
function of what the Court did when it rejected President Tru-
man's assertion of a broad emergency power.27 Youngstown's 
22. N.Y. Times 1 (April18, 1952). 
23. Youngstown, 103 F. Supp. at 576. Pine wrote: "Enough has been said to show 
the utter and complete lack of authoritative support for defendant's position. That there 
may be no doubt as to what it is, he states it unequivocally when he says in his brief that 
he does 'not perceive how Article II [of the Constitution] can be read ... so as to limit 
the Presidential power to meet all emergencies,' and he claims that the finding of the 
emergency is 'not subject to judicial review.' To my mind this spells a form of govern-
ment alien to our Constitutional government of limited powers. I therefore find that the 
acts of defendant are illegal and without authority of law." Id. 
24. 343 U.S. 579-710 (1952). For discussion of the various opinions see infra notes 
53-74. 
25. N. Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197,400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
26. Gerald Gunther, John Marshall's Defense of McCulloch v. Maryland 5 (Stan-
ford U. Press, 1969). 
. 27. The issues in the case, particularly the claim of an unfettered executive power to 
Identify and meet an emergency not subject to the judicial process, transcended the im-
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remarkable stature, its point of distinction, lies in the Court's 
commitment to the principle of executive subordination to the 
law, for if the Court could and would rebuke a presidential ac-
tion vigorously defended and executed in the name of national 
security in the context of the Korean War, which itself was part 
of a larger, indeed global, campaign against the Cold War men-
ace of communism, then the Court could and should restrain un-
founded claims of presidential power in somewhat more tranquil 
settings, as it did in New York Times v. United States and United 
States v. Nixon and again, later, in Clinton v. Jones.Z8 
In fact, few issues in our long Anglo-American constitu-
tional history can match the high drama, resounding importance 
and transcendent interest of the attempts by the judiciary to rein 
in executive power and subject it to the principle of the rule of 
law, an effort, of course, that lies at the core of constitutionalism. 
Indeed, the issue of the president's relationship to the law de-
fined the Steel Seizure Case and confronted the Justices of the 
Supreme Court with an issue with which judges have grappled 
since Sir Edward Coke's bold declaration in 1608 to an outraged 
King James I that the King is indeed subject to the law.29 
Youngstown featured an effort by the Truman Administration to 
revive the Stuart conception of an emergency power of the King. 
In its defense of President Truman's actions, Bernard Schwartz 
observed, "the Government advanced arguments that had not 
been heard in an English-speaking court since the time of 
Charles I. " 30 In fact, the sweeping assertions of presidential 
power that were adduced by Assistant Attorney General 
Baldridge in the courtroom of Federal District Judge Pine ech'-
oed those made on behalf of the Crown in 1642 in the famous 
case of the Ship Money, in which it was claimed that the King 
possessed an absolute prerogative to take any action he believed 
necessary for the welfare of the nation.31 Consider the following 
exchange between Baldridge and Pine: 
mediate importance of resolving the dispute. Thus Paul Kauper fairly observed: "It is in 
the setting of these larger questions that the Youngstown case assumes a significance of 
large dimensions, a significance exceeding impact on the problems of the steel strike with 
all of its economic and political repercussions." Kauper, 51 Mich. L. Rev. at 143-44 (cited 
in note 12). 
28. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 713; Nixon, 418 U.S. 683; Clinton, 520 U.S. 681. 
29. Sir William Holdsworth, 5 A History of English Law 428-31 (Methuen, 1937). 
30. Bernard Schwartz, 2 A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States: 
Part 1: The Powers of the Government 66 (The MacMillan Co., 1963). 
31. Id. at 66-67. Charles I asserted, before the judges of the court of Exchequer: 
"When the good and safety of the kingdom in general is concerned, and the whole king-
dom is in danger .... is not the king sole judge, both of the danger, and when and how 
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The Court: So you contend the Executive has unlimited 
power in time of an emergency? 
Mr. Baldridge: He has the power to take such action as is 
necessary to meet the emergency. 
The Court: If the emergency is great, it is unlimited, is it? 
Mr. Baldridge: I suppose if you carry it to its logical conclu-
sion, that is true .... 
The Court: And that the Executive determines the emer-
gencies and the courts cannot even review whether it is an 
emergency. 
Mr. Baldridge: That is correct. 
161 
The Administration reaffirmed its position at a later junc-
ture in the argument: 
The Court: So, when the sovereign people adopted the 
Constitution, it enumerated the powers set up in the Constitu-
tion, but limited the powers of the Congress and limited the 
powers of the judiciary, but it did not limit the powers of the 
Executive. Is that what you say? 
Mr. Baldridge: That is the way we read Article II of the 
Constitution. 32 
In the Case of Ship Money the King's judges, predictably, 
not only embraced the King's argument but repeated it verbatim 
in the body of their opinions.33 But Judge Pine, perhaps surpris-
the same is to be prevented and avoided?" Case of Ship-Money, 3 Howell's State Trials 
826,844 (1637), quoted in Banks, 14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 472 n.32 (cited in note 11). 
32. The government's argument is reproduced in Westin, The Anatomy of a Consti-
tutional Law Case at 59-65 (cited in note 12). 
33. 3 Howell's State Trials at 826,843 (cited in note 31), quoted in Banks, 14 U. Pitt. 
L. Rev. at 472 n.32 (cited in note 11). The reporter of Ship-Money wrote: "This Judg-
ment ... gave much offense to the nation, and occasioned great heart-burnings in the 
house of commons." ld. at 1254. In Parliament, Lord Falkland stated: "It seemed gener-
ally strange, that they [the judges] saw not the law which all men else saw but themselves. 
Yet though this begot the more general wonder, three other particulars begot the more 
general indignation. When they had allowed the king, the sole power in necessity, the 
sole judgement of necessity, and by that enabled him to take from us, what he would, 
when he would, and how he would, they yet continued to persuade us, that they had left 
us our liberties and our properties." Id. at 1260-61. 
The House of Commons later resolved that the charges imposed by the King's writ, 
"the extrajudicial Opinions of the judges ... the [King's] Writ ... and the Judgment ... 
arc against the laws of the realm, the right of property, and the liberty of the subjects, 
and contrary to the former resolutions in parliament, and to the Petition of Right." I d. at 
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ingly,34 refused to bow before the claims of presidential preroga-
tive power. Indeed, he held, in simple but powerful terms, that 
there was nothing in the Constitution to support the Administra-
tion's assertion of an undefined, inherent emergency power in 
the president: 
Enough has been said to show the utter and complete lack 
of authoritative support for defendant's position. That there 
may be no doubt as to what it is, he states it unequivocally 
when he says in his brief that he does "'not perceive how Ar-
ticle II [of the Constitution] can be read ... so as to limit the 
Presidential power to meet all emergencies,' and he claims 
that the finding of the emergency is 'not subject to judicial re-
view.' To my mind this spells a form of government alien to 
our Constitutional government of limited powers. I therefore 
find that the acts of defendant are illegal and without author-
ity of law. "35 
The central question raised in the proceedings-whether 
the president enjoyed an inherent or emergency power to seize 
the steel mills-triggered in the Supreme Court the most thor-
ough and penetrating examination of presidential power to date. 
Indeed, it raised a question of profound importance to a nation 
committed to the rule of law. The delegates to the Constitu-
tional Convention were entitled to believe that they had suc-
ceeded in subordinating the executive to the Constitution.36 
Still, there remained the problem of emergency and it con-
fronted the principle of the rule of law with an awkward though 
undeniable challenge, one immortalized in the words of Presi-
dent Abraham Lincoln, who wrestled with the question in the 
1262. For an outstanding discussion of the King's prerogative power see Francis D. 
Wormuth, The Royal Prerogative 1603-49 (Cornell U. Press, 1939), and for a continua-
tion of the discussion see his, The Origins of Modern Constitutionalism (Harper & Broth-
ers, 1949). 
34. Chief Justice Rehnquist has written: "A single district judge was thought very 
unlikely to be willing to take on the President of the United States in this fashion." 
Rehnquist, 20 Suffolk U. L. Rev. at 758 (cited in note 13). He believed that the case re-
sembled an "0. Henry" ending. ld. at 753. 
35. Youngstown, 103 F. Supp. at 576. 
36. The subordination of the executive to the rule of law represented at the time of 
the founding period, the critical difference between republicanism and monarchy. The 
Take Care Clause of Article II commands the president to "take care that the laws be 
faithfully executed," a duty which includes enforcement of federal statutes, which are 
designated by Article VI as the "Supreme law of the land." Clearly, laws enacted by 
Congress are binding on the president. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154-
62 (1803), stressed the president's amenability to statutes by holding that an act of Con-
gress required the Secretary of State to deliver Marbury's commission. The impeach-
ment power of Congress would be irrelevant, moreover, if the president was not confined 
by the Constitution. 
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clamor and conflict of the Civil War: "Are all the laws but one," 
he asked, "to go unexecuted, and the Government itself go to 
pieces lest that one be violated? Even in such a case, would not 
the official oath be broken if the Government should be over-
thrown when it was believed that disregarding the single law 
would tend to preserve it?"37 If the president does in fact pos-
sess an emergency or prerogative power, which John Locke de-
scribed in terms made famous, as the "[P]ower to act according 
to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of 
Law, and sometimes even against it,"38 What are its limits, if 
any? Does the existence of an emergency reallocate constitu-
tional powers? As a corollary, may the president ignore or re-
vise the Constitution? These thorny questions have lon.p been 
the subject of debate among academics and practitioners.3 
President Truman's capacious view of the powers of presi-
dency raised anew questions about constitutional purposes, 
powers, and limitations, and they invited reconsideration about 
judicial interpretation of presidential power. Before proceeding 
to a discussion of the Supreme Court's analysis of Truman's reli-
ance on the claim of inherent executive power, let us return to 
the founding period. The debates in the Convention are illumi-
nating, but so are the actions that the Framers took, as reflected 
in the text of the Constitution. 
THEFOUNDERSANDEXECUTNEPOWER 
Article II, section I of the Constitution provides: "The ex-
ecutive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States 
of America." Sections two and three enumerate presidential 
powers and responsibilities, including the duty that "he shall 
take care that the laws be faithfully executed."40 An understand-
37. Message of July 4, 1861, quoted in EdwardS. Corwin, The President: Office and 
Powers 1787-1948 at 77 (New York U. Press, 3d ed. 1948). 
38. For an excellent discussion of the Lockean Prerogative, and its application to 
American political thought, see Donald L. Robinson, Presidential Prerogative and the 
Spirit of American Constitutionalism, in Adler and George, The Constitution and the 
Conduct of American Foreign Policy at 114-32 (cited in note 2); Robert Scigliano, The 
President's "Prerogative Power", in Cronin, Inventing the American Presidency at 236-56 
(cited in note 2); Thomas S. Langston and Michael E. Lind,John Locke and the Limits of 
Presidential Prerogative, 24 Polity 49-68 (1991). 
39. The essential differences in viewpoints may be gathered in the opinions held by 
Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft, as discussed in Taft, Our Chief Magis-
trate and His Powers 141-47 (Columbia U. Press, 1916). See also the discussion in Banks, 
14 U. Pitt. L. Rev. at 516-29 (cited in note 11); and the opinions set forth in the various 
essays in Cronin, Inventing the American Presidency (cited in note 2). 
40. U.S. Canst., Art. II, § 3. 
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ing of the Vesting Clause, long the subject of academic debate, 
may be gathered from debates in the Constitutional Convention 
and in the several state ratifying conventions. It is instructive as 
well to recall the understanding of the term, "executive power," 
on the eve of the Philadelphia Convention. The acclaimed legal 
historian, Julius Goebel, observed that "executive," 
as a noun ... was not then a word of art in English law-
above all it was not so in reference to the crown. It had be-
come a word of art in American law through its employment 
in various state constitutions adopted from 1776 onward ... It 
reflected ... the revolutionary response to the situation pre-
cipitated by the repudiation of the royal prerogative.41 
The use of the word "prerogative," as Robert Sciglano has dem-
onstrated, was, among the founders, a term of derision, a politi-
cal shaft intended to taint an opponent with the stench of mon-
archism.42 The rejection of the use of the word "prerogative" in 
favor of the new and more republic-friendly noun of "executive" 
necessitated discussion and explanation of its scope and content. 
The meager scope of authority granted to state executives is 
illustrated by the provisions of state constitutions. Despite in-
trinsic flaws and deficiencies in an omnipotent legislature under 
the Virginia Constitution of 1776, Thomas Jefferson noted in his 
1783 "Draft of a Fundamental Constitution for Virginia": "By 
Executive powers, we mean no reference to the powers exer-
cised under our former government by the Crown as of its pre-
rogative ... We give them these powers only, which are neces-
sary to execute the laws (and administer the government)."43 
This approach was reflected in the Virginia Plan, which Edmund 
Randolph introduced to the Constitutional Convention, and 
which provided for a "national executive ... with power to carry 
into execution the national laws ... [and] to appoint to offices in 
cases not otherwise provided for." 44 For the Framers, the phrase 
"executive power" was limited, as James Wilson said, "to execut-
ing the laws, and appointing officers. "45 Roger Sherman "con-
sidered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an insti-
41. Julius Goebel, Jr., Ex Parte Clio, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 450,474 (1954). 
42. Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in Cronin, Inventing the Ameri-
can Presidency at 248 (cited in note 2). 
43. Quoted in Charles Warren, The Making of the Constitution 177 (Harvard U. 
Press, 194 7). 
44. Max Farrand, 1 The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 at 62-63 (Yale 
U. Press, 1911). 
45. Id. at 66. 
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tution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect. "46 
Madison agreed with Wilson's definition of executive power. He 
thought it necessary "to fix the extent of Executive authority ... 
as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be 
given to that departmt [sic]," and added that "a definition of 
their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far 
they might be safely entrusted to a single officer."47 The defini-
tion of the executive's power should be precise, thought Madi-
son; the executive power "should be confined and defined. "48 
And so it was. In a draft reported by Wilson, the phrase, "The 
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single 
Person," first appeared.49 His draft included an enumeration of 
the president's power to grant reprieves and pardons and to 
serve as commander-in-chief; it included as well the charge that 
"it shall be his duty to provide for the due and faithful execution 
of the Laws. "50 The report of the Committee of Detail altered 
the "faithful execution" phrase to "he shall take care that the 
laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed."51 
This form was referred to the Committee on Style, which drafted 
the version that appears in the Constitution: "The executive 
power shall be vested in a president of the United States of 
America .... [H]e shall take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted."52 
The debate on "executive power," to the extent that there 
was one, centered almost entirely on whether there should be a 
single or plural presidency. Edward Corwin fairly remarked: 
"The Records of the Constitutional Convention make it clear 
that the purposes of this clause were simply to settle the question 
whether the executive branch should be plural or single and to 
give the executive a title. "53 There was no challenge to the defi-
nition of executive power held by Wilson and Madison; nor was 
an alternative understanding advanced. And there was no ar-
gument about the scope of executive power; indeed, any latent 
fears were quickly allayed. For example, in response to the 
Randolph Plan, which provided for a "national executive" that 
would have "authority to execute the national laws ... and enjoy 
46. Id. at 65. 
47. Id. at 66-67. 
48. Id. at 70. 
49. Farrand, 2 Records at 171 (cited in note 44). 
50. Id. 
51. Id. at 185. 
52. Seeid.at572,574,597,600. 
53. Corwin, 53 Colum. L. Rev. at 53 (cited in note 12). 
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the executive rights vested in Congress by the confederation, "54 
Charles Pinkney said he was "for a vigorous executive but was 
afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might ex-
tend to peace & war & which would render the Executive a 
Monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one."55 John 
Rutledge shared his concern. He said "he was for vesting the 
Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving 
him the power of war and peace. "56 Wilson sought to ease their 
fears; he "did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Mon-
arch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some 
of these prerogatives were of a Legislative nature. Among oth-
ers that of war & peace. The only powers he conceived strictly 
Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing offi-
cers, not (appertaining to and) appointed by the Legislature. "57 
The absence of a challenge to the Madison-Wilson-Sherman un-
derstanding of executive power, the reassurance, moreover, that 
executive power did not constitute a source of warmaking au-
thority or, more generally, a foreign affairs power, and that the 
concept of prerogative was ill-suited to a Republic, left little to 
fear about the office.58 
If it is true, as Corwin observed, that Wilson was the leader 
of the strong executive wing of the Convention, a remark made 
comprehensible perhaps by the unwillingness of any other mem-
ber to espouse a conception of executive power more expansive 
than Wilson's stated parameters-to execute the laws and make 
appointments to office-what, we may ask, was the understand-
ing of the phrase held by members of the various state ratifying 
conventions? In South Carolina, Charles Pinckney reported that 
"we have defined his powers, and bound him to such limits, as 
will effectually prevent his usurping authority." Similarly, Chief 
Justice Thomas McKean told the Pennsylvania Ratifying Con-
vention that executive officers "have no ... authority ... beyond 
what is by positive grant ... delegated to them." In Virginia, 
Governor Randolph asked, "What are his powers? To see the 
laws executed. Every executive in America has that power." 
54. Farrand, 1 Records at 65-66 (cited in note 44). 
55. Id. at 64-65. 
56. Id. at 65. 
57. Farrand, 1 Records at 62-70 (cited in note 44). 
58. While various presidents and commentators have sought to squeeze from the 
Vesting Clause a presidential authority to make war, the claim was considered and re-
jected at the Convention; indeed, it caused much alarm. The Supreme Court, moreover, 
has never viewed the clause as a source of presidential power to initiate war or to con-
duct foreign policy. For discussion, see Adler, Warmaking at 14-17 (cited in note 3). 
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That view was echoed by James Iredell in North Carolina, and 
James Bowdoin in Massachusetts, who said the president's pow-
ers were "precisely those of the governors."59 
And the powers of the governors were strictly limited. The 
Virginia Constitution of 1776, for example, stated that the gov-
ernor shall "exercise the executive powers of government, ac-
cording to the laws of this Commonwealth; and shall not, under 
any pretense, exercise any power or ~erogative, by virtue of any 
law, statute or custom of England." As we have seen, more-
over, Jefferson sought in 1783 in his "Draft of a Fundamental 
Constitution for Virginia," to place beyond doubt that "By Ex-
ecutive powers, we mean no reference to the powers exercised 
under our former government by the Crown as of its preroga-
tives .... "61 In short, as Madison concluded, state executives 
across the land were "little more than cyphers."62 
It is not at all surprising that the founding generation would 
so sharply limit the power of its executives. In colonial America, 
the belief was prevalent, wrote Corwin, that "the 'executive 
magistracy' was the natural enemy, the legislative assembly the 
natural friend of liberty."63 There was a deep fear of the poten-
tial for abuse of power in the hands of both hereditary and 
elected rulers. The colonial experience had laid bare the sources 
of despotism. "The executive power," said a Delaware Whig, "is 
ever restless, ambitious, and ever grasping at encrease of 
power."64 Thus Madison wrote in Federalist No. 48: "The foun-
ders of our republics . . . seem never for a moment to have 
turned their eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown 
and all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate."65 
59. Jonathan Elliot, 2 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption 
of the Federal Constitution 540; 3: 201; 4: 107; 2: 128 (Washington: Printed by and for the 
Editor, 2d ed. 1836). 
60. Ben Perley Poore, 2 Federal and State Constitutions, Colonial Charters, and 
Other-Organic Laws of the United States 1910-11 (Washington, Government Printing Of-
fice, 1877). 
61. Quoted in Warren, The Making of the Constitution at 177 (cited in note 43). 
62. Farrand, 2 Records at 35 (cited in note 44). 
63. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers, 1787-1984 at 5-6 (New 
York U. Press, 5th rev. ed.1984). 
64. Quoted in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic 1776-1787 
at 135 (U. of North Carolina Press, 1969), citing Moses Mathe, America's Appeal to the 
Impartial World 6 (Hartford, 1775). The colonists were virtually obsessed with power, 
"its endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." Ber-
nard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 56-57 (The Belknap 
Press of Harvard U. Press, 1967). 
65. Federalist 48 (Madison), in Edward Mead Earle, Intra, The Federalist Papers 
321-22 (Modern Library, 1937). 
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It was in this context, then, that the Framers designed the 
office of the presidency. Far from establishing an executive re-
sembling a monarchy, the Framers, in fact, severed all roots to 
the royal prerogative. The Framers' rejection of the British 
model, grounded in their fear of executive power and their em-
brace of republican principles, was repeatedly stressed by de-
fenders of the Constitution. William Davie, a delegate in Phila-
delphia, explained to the North Carolina Convention, that "that 
jealousy of executive power which has shown itself so strongly in 
all the American governments, would not admit" of vesting the 
treaty powers in the president alone, a principle reaffirmed by 
Hamilton in Federalist No. 75: "the history of human virtue does 
not warrant placing such awesome authority in one person. "66 
Hamilton, in fact, was at the center of Federalist writings that at-
tempted to allay any concerns about the creation of an embry-
onic monarchy. In Federalist No. 69, he conducted a detailed 
analysis of the enumerated powers granted to the president. In 
his capacity as commander in chief, for example, the president 
would be "first General and Admiral, "67 a post that carried with 
it no authority to initiate war. The president's authority to re-
ceive ambassadors, moreover, "is more a matter of dignity than 
of authority," an administrative function "without conse-
quence. "68 Thus Hamilton concluded that nothing was "to be 
feared" from an executive "with the confined authorities of a 
President. "69 
The confined nature of the presidency, a conception re-
flected, for example, in Wilson's observation that the president is 
expected to execute the laws and make appointments to office, 
or in Sherman's remark that "he considered the Executive mag-
istracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will 
of the Legislature into effect," represented a characterization 
that was never challenged throughout the Convention.70 No 
delegate advanced a theory of inherent power. Madison justly 
remarked: "The natural province of the executive magistrate is 
to execute laws, as that of the legislature is to make laws. All his 
acts, therefore, properly executive, must presuppose the exis-
tence of the laws to be executed."71 The proposition that the 
66. Elliot, 4 Debates at 134 (cited in note 59); Federalist 75 (Hamilton) at 485, 487 
(cited in note 65). 
67. Federalist 69 (Hamilton) at 445, 448 (cited in note 65). 
68. ld. at 451. 
69. Federalist 71 (Hamilton) at 463,468 (cited in note 65). 
70. Farrand, 1 Records at 65 (cited in note 44). 
71. James Madison, 6 The Writings of lames Madison 145 Gaillard Hunt, ed., 9 vols. 
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president was subject to the law constitutes the essence of the 
rule of law, and "[a]t the time of the Revolution and in the early 
days of the Republic, it was thought that republican government 
differed from the monarchies of Europe in precisely this re-
spect."72 
Despite the clarity of the Convention's aims, as reflected in 
the meager textual allocation of power to the president, aims 
reasonably illuminated by discussion and debate in Philadelphia, 
there is yet another tradition in America which is represented in 
a large body of literature that extols the virtues of presidential 
power, a school that has its foundation in a broader, more ex-
pansive interpretation of "executive power," a school which, if it 
cannot find its footing in the debates in Philadelphia-in the ar-
guments, discussion or train of thought of the Convention-does 
purport to find its footing in the arguments, debates and prac-
tices in the early days of the Republic. To borrow from Corwin 
again, if the Framers did not intend by virtue of the term "execu-
tive power," to vest in the president a residual or inherent 
power, if they had no intent, by virtue of the "Vesting Clause," 
to grant to the president a power to act beyond or in the absence 
of laws in what is commonly, though incorrectly, regarded as a 
Lockean prerogative, then perhaps the concept of inherent 
power was "grafted on the presidency" by presidents, jurists and 
scholars, among others.73 Indeed, given the absence in the Con-
vention of an understanding of executive power that challenged 
the Madison-Wilson-Sherman conception, it would seem fair to 
say that the broader, more expansive conception of executive 
power, as the embodiment of inherent, residual, prerogative, or 
emergency authority, represents a gloss on the Vesting Clause. 
In his famous defense of President George Washington's 
Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793, Hamilton, writing as "Pacifi-
cus," applied the initial gloss on "executive power" in his claim 
of an "inherent" presidential power. In the course of his de-
(Putnam, 1900-1910). 
72. Wormuth and Firmage, To Chain the Dog of War at 165 (cited in note 3). 
73. See Scigliano's enlightening discussion of Locke's understanding of prerogative, 
which required a legislative act indemnifying the executive who violated the law, in con-
trast with a substantial body of literature that perceives the Lockean prerogative as justi-
fication for unilateral executive action in violation of the laws in the response to an 
emergency, and which holds, as a consequence, that legislative indemnification is utterly 
unnecessary. Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in Cronin, Inventing the 
American Presidency at 236-56 (cited in note 2). See also, Adler, Warmaking at 32-33 
(cited in note 3) for the argument that the Framers did not incorporate a so-called 
Lockean Prerogative; Langston and Lind, 24 Polity at 50-68 (cited in note 38); Wilmer-
ding, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. at 321-38 (cited in note 12). 
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fense, Hamilton emphasized the differences between the Consti-
tution's assignment to Congress in Article I of "all legislative 
powers hereinafter granted" and the more general grant in Arti-
cle II of the executive power to the president. Hamilton con-
tended that the Constitution embodies an independent, substan-
tive grant of executive power. The subsequent enumeration of 
specific executive powers was, he argued, only "intended by way 
of greater caution, to specify and regulate the principal articles 
implied in the definition of Executive Power." He added: "The 
general doctrine then of our constitution is, that the 
EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested in the President; 
subject only to the exceptions and qualifications which are ex-
pressed in the instrument."74 In Myers v. United States/5 Chief 
Justice William Howard Taft seemed to embrace the Hamilto-
nian conception: "The executive power was given in general 
terms, strengthened by specific terms where emphasis was re-
garded as appropriate, and was limited by direct expressions 
where limitation was needed .... " 
Hamilton's interpretive effort to adduce a substantive con-
ception of executive power, particularly from differences in ter-
minology between Article I and Article II, is fraught with diffi-
culties. The Convention debates provide no basis for ascribing 
any significance to the difference in phraseology between the 
legislative powers "herein granted" and "The Executive Power." 
Indeed, it was only in the last days of the Convention-
September 12, to be exact-that a change in the terms occurred 
through a report of the Committee on Style, which altered Con-
gress's legislative powers to those "herein granted," but made no 
change in the phrase, "the executive power." The change likely 
represented an effort to reaffirm the limits of federalism and the 
regulatory authority of Congress, and allay concerns of states, 
which feared for their legislative authority, rather than an effort 
to recognize a substantive conception of executive power. The 
change in language affected Congress and, on its face, had noth-
ing to do with the executive, but if it did, the route to a substan-
tive conception of executive power could not have been more 
circumlocutory by design. 
In fact, Hamilton's claim of an independent, substantive 
conception of executive power is vulnerable on several counts. 
74. Hamilton, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in Harold C. Syrett, et al., 
eds., 15 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 33, 39 (Columbia U. Press, 1969). 
75. 272 u.s. 52, 118 (1926). 
2002] STEEL SEIZURE CASE 171 
First, there is no evidence from the Convention debates to sup-
port the claim. Given the Framer's aversion to executive author-
ity, and their consequent enumeration of presidential power, one 
would expect to find in the Convention some comment, some 
argument or some shred of evidence to indicate that the Conven-
tion intended to vest the president with a broad grant of execu-
tive authority. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that such a full 
swing of the pendulum, from a deep-seated fear of the executive 
to an abiding confidence in it, strong enough to warrant a grant 
of broad discretionary authority, could be accomplished without 
comment, and yet the record reveals no such shift in thinking. 
Hamilton's explanation that the Convention intended merely to 
specify and regulate what he termed the "principal" articles im-
plied in the definition of executive power, raises additional ques-
tions. His use of the word "regulate" implies limitations, a con-
cept at the core of the Framers' effort, in Madison's words, to 
"confine and define" executive power, but one at odds with a 
broad grant of undefined residual authority. Moreover, why 
would the Convention, from Hamilton's perspective, feel the 
need to enumerate a presidential power to require opinions in 
writing if the president possessed a broad residuum of executive 
authority? Pacificus's argument that only those executive arti-
cles that were "principal" articles seems at odds with the con-
cept of inherent power, for is there anything more inherent in 
executive authority than the power to require a subordinate to 
place an opinion in writing? Justice James McReynolds' power-
ful dissent in Myers v. United States (1926), surely exposed this 
flaw in Hamiltonian theory of inherent power, for it was, he 
wrote, 
beyond the ordinary imagination to picture 40 or 50 capable 
men, presided over by George Washington, vainly discussing, 
in the heat of a Philadelphia summer, whether express author-
ity to require opinions in writing should be delegated to a 
President in whom they had already vested the illimitable ex-
ecutive power here claimed. 76 
Let us briefly consider other problems with Hamilton's the-
ory of inherent power. The argument he advanced as Pacificus, 
as Madison noted, contradicted his explanation of presidential 
power in Federalist No. 69. Hamilton was entitled to change his 
own mind, of course, but an apparent shift in his conception of 
executive power in 1793 does not alter the Convention's under-
76. 272 U.S. at 207. 
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standing, which Hamilton reported in Federalist No. 69 in his 
analysis of each of the enumerated powers of the president, an 
analysis upon which delegates to the various state ratifying con-
ventions, including his own in New York, relied in their adoption 
of the Constitution. His analysis in Federalist 69 served to allay 
fears that the president would exercise the powers of an over-
weening executive. The president, as commander-in-chief, 
would not have the authority of authorizing war; that power, he 
wrote, was vested in Congress. Of the president's authority to 
receive ambassadors, Hamilton said, it "is more a matter of dig-
nity than of authority ... without consequence." In Federalist 
No. 75, as we have seen, he observed that the president was not 
granted the power to make treaties, because "the history of hu-
man conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of human 
virtue."77 But suddenly, as Pacificus, Hamilton asserted a broad, 
"comprehensive grant" of executive power to the president. 
One is left to wonder at the capacious scope and theoretical lim-
its of an inherent power and how it might be reconciled with 
Madison's reminder in Federalist No. 51 that "in republican 
government, the legislative authority necessarily predomi-
nates."78 Manifestly, the Framers did not endow the president 
with more power than it vested in Congress, but with less; yet the 
allocation of power between the executive and legislative 
branches, presumably clarified by an enumerative scheme, may 
be blurred, and indeed corrupted, by an inherent executive 
power capable of overwhelming powers that are constitutionally 
enumerated and assigned to Congress. Unless we are willing, 
therefore, to abandon the concept of a constitutionally-limited 
inherent presidential power, however broad it may be, and to 
view it as a consuming, cannibalistic power, there remains the 
need to address some conceptual limits. Here, at least, Pacificus 
offered a benchmark: "The general doctrine then of our consti-
tution is, that the EXECUTIVE POWER of the Nation is vested 
in the President; subject only to the excef?.tions and qualifications 
which are expressed in the instrument." 9 The "exceptions and 
qualifications" approach permits an understanding, at a mini-
mum, that under the banner of executive power a president may 
not lay claim to any of the powers, express or implied, that are 
allocated to either Congress or the judiciary. Thus, it seems in-
disputable, for example, that the president derives from the 
77. Federalist 75 (Hamilton) 485,487 (cited in note 65). 
78. Federalist 51 (Hamilton or Madison) 335, 338 (cited in note 65). 
79. Hamilton, 15 Papers at 39 (cited in note 74). 
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Constitution no lawmaking authority, the quintessential congres-
sional power. 
EMERGENCY POWER 
The Convention, it seems clear, did not entertain a doctrine 
of necessity or a theory of emergency power. There is no evi-
dence, moreover, that the Framers intended to incorporate the 
Lockean Prerogative in the Constitution. And lacking a textual 
statement or grant of power to that effect, such an intent is in-
dispensable to the claim of a constitutional power. In fact, as we 
have seen, the evidence runs in the other direction. Fears of ex-
ecutive power led the Framers to enumerate the president's 
power; they undertook to "define and confine" the scope of his 
authority. And clearly, an undefined reservoir of discretionary 
power in the form of Locke's prerogative would have unraveled 
the carefully crafted design of Article II and repudiated the 
Framers' stated aim of corralling executive power. But the Con-
vention did not even look in the direction of prerogative power. 
Rather, the delegates imposed on the president a solemn duty to 
"faithfully execute the laws" and, as a necessary consequence, 
stripped him of the monarch's dispensing and suspending pow-
ers, powers which were utterly discordant with the president's 
duties under the Take Care Clause. Moreover, no early legal 
treatise, or commentary, from the pens of Wilson or Kent, Story 
or Rawle, spoke of an executive's authority to violate laws in the 
context of an emergency.80 
But if the Convention rejected the concept of an inherent 
executive power, what was the solution to emergency, for it was 
understood that the law could not provide an immediate remedy 
for every conceivable situation that the nation might encoun-
ter.81 And if the existence of an emergency did not serve to re-
80. The Framers followed Madison's advice that presidential power "shd. be con-
fined and defined." Farrand, 2 Records at 65-70 (cited in note 44). See generally, Adler, 
Warmaking at 14-17 (cited in note 3); Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in 
Cronin, Inventing the American Presidency at 236-56 (cited in note 2). 
81. Justice Jackson pointed out in Youngstown that the Framers were familiar with 
emergencies: "They knew what emergencies were, knew the pressures they engender for 
authoritative action, knew, too, how they afford a ready pretext for usurpation. We may 
also suspect that they suspected that emergency powers would tend to kindle emergen-
cies." 343 U.S. at 650. Jackson added that with the exception of the "suspension of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in time of rebellion or invasion, when the public 
safety may require it, they made no express provision for exercise of extraordinary author-
ity because of a crisis." Id. (emphasis added; footnotes omitted). Jackson's opinion 
served to reaffirm Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes' opinion of the Court in Schechter 
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distribute the powers of government allocated by the Constitu-
tion, what mechanism lay within the grasp of government to 
meet the emergency? 
The solution to emergency was found in the doctrine of ret-
roactive ratification, a practice rooted in England and one with 
which the founders were familiar. Lord Dicey explained the 
method that emerged in English law: "There are times of tumult 
and invasion when for the sake of legality itself the rules must be 
broken. The course which the government must then take is 
clear. The ministry must break the law and trust for protection 
to an act of immunity."82 This doctrine was adopted and fol-
lowed in America. In its application, if the president perceived 
an emergency, he could act illegally and turn to Congress for 
ratification of his actions. Congressional ratification would 
hinge on the question of whether Congress shared the presi-
dent's perception of emergency. The chief virtue in this practice 
was that it left to Congress, as the nation's lawmaking authority, 
the ultimate determination of the existence of an emergency, 
and it prevented the president from sitting as judge of his own 
cause, a principle of over-arching importance in Anglo-
American legal history.83 Only an exceedingly bold and arrogant 
declaration of High Prerogative could justify the view that a 
president might judge his own act of usurpation, for such a doc-
trine would place the laws of the nation at his mercy.84 Further 
virtue in the practice of legislative immunity or indemnification 
may be drawn from the fact that it is likely to temper presiden-
tial claims of emergency. Since resort to Congress for vindica-
tion and exoneration represents an admission of executive usur-
pation, a president is unlikely to respond to an emergency with 
extra-legal measures, and as a consequence risk his own fate and 
fortune, unless he is confident that the legislature would likewise 
Poultry Corp. v. United States: "Extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge consti-
tutional power." 295 U.S. 495, 528 (1935). 
82. Albert Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution 513-14, 
(Liberty Classics, 1982). 
83. For centuries, the common law had been known to prohibit a man from judging 
his own cause. Sir Edward Coke had stated the rule in Dr. Bowham's Case, 8 Co. Rep. 
113b, 77 E.R. 646 (1610). Madison stated in Federalist No. 49 at 328, that "neither [the 
executive nor the legislative] can pretend to an exclusive or superior right of settling the 
boundaries between their respective powers." 
84. Lucius Wilmerding rightly observed: "For if the President is the judge of the 
necessity, his power is unlimited; he may apply his discretion to any instance what-
ever .... " Wilmerding, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. at 330 (cited in note 12). Members of Parliament 
lamented the Court's ruling in The Ship Money Case of 1637, which acknowledged the 
King's power as the "sole" judge of emergency and how to respond to it. 3 Howell's State 
Trials at 826,843 (cited in note 31). 
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view his acts as an indispensable necessity. In any event, it is ap-
parent that the doctrine of retroactive ratification, which incor-
porates elements of both the doctrine of separation of powers 
and doctrine of checks and balances, maintains a semblance of 
constitutional government. 
Whether it is true, as Lucius Wilmerding observed, that 
"this doctrine was accepted by every single one of our early 
statesman,"85 one will perhaps search the records in vain for ex-
pression of an alternative doctrine which asserts executive au-
thority to violate the law.86 Wilmerding, whom Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. has rightly characterized as a "careful scholar,"87 
has compiled an impressive record of incidents and controversies 
at the dawn of the Republic which reflect the founders' com-
mitment to the practice of legislative immunity.88 Representa-
tive Alexander White, a leader in the Virginia Ratifying Conven-
tion, addressed the practice of legislative indemnification in the 
First Congress: 
I will relate an example. In Virginia, when the operations of 
the war required the exertions of the chief magistrate beyond 
the authority of the law, our late governor Nelson, whose 
name must be clear to every friend of liberty, was obliged to 
issue his warrants and impress supplies for the army; though it 
was well known he had exceeded his authority; his warrants 
were executed, his country was benefitted by this resolute 
measure, and he himself afterwards indemnified by the legis-
lature. This corresponds with the practice under every limited 
government. 89 
Two additional early episodes, one involving Alexander Hamil-
ton and the other Thomas Jefferson, illustrate the breadth of 
philosophical and political support afforded the doctrine of legis-
lative indemnification. Let a third example-the famous ratifi-
cation of Abraham Lincoln's extra-constitutional actions taken 
in the Civil War-suffice to demonstrate the rich historical cur-
rency of the practice. 
85. Wilmerding, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. at 122 (cited in note 12). 
86. See Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in Cronin, Inventing the 
American Presidency at 248 (cited in note 2). 
87. Schlesinger, The Imperial Presidency at 10 (cited in note 2). 
88. See Wilmerding's discussion, 67 Pol. Sci. Q. at 115-21 (cited in note 12). See 
also, Scigliano, The President's "Prerogative Power," in Cronin, Inventing the American 
Presidency at 246-56 (cited in note 2). 
89. 1 Congressional Register 525-26. 
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In 1793, Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, was the 
subject of a House resolution that charged him with violations of 
the appropriations laws. Representative William B. Giles of 
Virginia introduced the resolutions, the first of which stated: 
"Resolved, that it is essential to the due administration of the 
government of the United States, that laws making specific ap-
propriations of money should be strictly observed by the admin-
istrator of the finances thereof."90 Hamilton denied any wrong-
doing and the House vindicated his denial. But in the course of 
debate, both sides acknowledged the controlling weight of legis-
lative indemnification. Representative William Smith of South 
Carolina, who acted as Hamilton's spokesman in the House, 
noted his agreement with the principle of the resolution, but 
added, 
yet it must be admitted that there may be cases of a sufficient 
urgency to justify a departure from it, and to make it the duty 
of the legislature to indemnify an officer; as if an adherence 
would in particular cases, and under particular circumstances, 
prove ruinous to the public credit, or prevent the taking 
measures essential to the public safety, against invasion or in-
surrection. 91 
But a vote on such a "proposition," according to Smith, would 
require prior examination of all the surrounding "circumstances 
which would warrant any departure" from the law. He con-
cluded: "let every deviation from law be tested by its own merits 
or demerits."92 Supporters of the resolution conceded the need 
for legislative ratification.93 
In 1807, a British warship attacked the Chesapeake. Be-
cause Congress was in recess, President Jefferson spent unap-
propriated funds in violation of the law. "To have awaited a 
90. Journal of the House of Representatives, 2d Sess. at 147, quoted in Wilmerding, 
67 Pol. Sci. Q. at 116-18 (cited in note 12). 
91. 4 Gazette of the United States 321 (March 9, 1793), quoted in Wilmerding, 67 
Pol. Sci. Q. at 117 (cited in note 12). 
92. ld. 
93. Rep. Findley, a strong supporter or the measure, acknowledged the point: 
I will admit that an executive officer, pressed by some urgent and unexpected 
necessity, may be induced to depart from the authorized path _of duty, and have 
great merit in so doing .... But in such a? emergency, the off1~r s~ actmg will 
embrace the earliest opportunity to explam the matter and obtam a JUStificatiOn 
whilst the recent feeling arising from the occasion advocates his cause in the 
public mind. Has the Secretary done so in the present instance? No; his con-
duct has been the very reverse. 
2 National Gazette 156 (March 13, 1793), quoted in Wilmerding, 67 Pol. Sci. 0. at 118 
(cited in note 12). 
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previous and special sanction by law," he explained to Congress 
in seeking retroactive approval, "would have lost occasions 
which might not be retrieved .... I trust that the Legislature, 
feeling the same anxiety for the safety of our country ... will ap-
prove, when done, what they would have seen so important to be 
done if then assembled. "94 In the debate that preceded congres-
sional sanction of Jefferson's unauthorized expenditures, mem-
bers duly emphasized the illegal character of his acts, of course, 
but they focused on the pivotal question underlying every re-
quest for ratification, as expressed on the House floor by the 
prominent Federalist, Representative Samuel W. Dana of Con-
necticut: "Would you ... had you assembled at this time, with a 
knowledge of all the existing circumstances-would you have au-
thorized these expenses to be incurred."95 But if Congress did 
not share the president's perception of emergency, or the acts 
that he performed to meet it-if, indeed, "the Legislature con-
demns the procedure," Dana added, then "the officers must bear 
the loss."96 
The importance ascribed by the Founders to the practice of 
retroactive ratification, and its rationale, were underscored in 
Jefferson's correspondence. In 1807, when confronted with the 
Burr conspiracy, Jefferson wrote: "[o]n great occasions every 
good officer must be ready to risk himself in going beyond the 
strict line of the law, when the public preservation requires it; his 
motives will be a justification. "97 Whether or not Congress 
would grant immunity would hinge on its perception of the offi-
cer's "motives" or the "existing circumstances" that defined the 
emergency. In 1810, Jefferson provided a more detailed analysis 
of the virtue and value of the doctrine, in terms that anticipated 
and, perhaps, influenced Lincoln's own views on emergency, 
when he was asked: "Are there not periods when, in free gov-
94. James D. Richardson,! A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi-
dents, 1789-1902 at 428 (Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1903). 
95. 17 Annals of Con g. 827. Congress granted the retroactive ratification in an Act 
of Nov. 24, 1807. Rep. G. W. Campbell affirmed Rep. Dana's point when he noted that 
"cases of exigency required extraordinary remedies," and the question before the House 
was "whether the House would sanction these expenditures or not: whether the exigency 
of the case would justify them." I d. at 829, 824. 
96. The "loss" could certainly include impeachment, and removal from office at 
least for principal officers. See Raoul Berger, Impeachment: The Constitutional Problems 
56-107 (Harvard U. Press, 1973). 
97. Jefferson to W.C.C. Claiborne, Feb. 3, 1807, in Jefferson, 11 The Writings of 
Thomas Jefferson 151 (Andrew A. Lipscomb and Albert E. Bergh, eds., Thomas Jeffer-
son Memorial Association, 1904). 
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ernments, it is necessary for officers in responsible stations to 
exercise an authority beyond the law ... ?"98 Jefferson wrote: 
A strict observance of the written laws is doubtless one of the 
high duties of a good citizen, but it is not the highest. The laws 
of necessity, of self-preservation, of saving our country when 
in danger, are of ~igher obligation. To lose our country by a 
scrupulous adherence to written law, would be to lose the law 
itself, with life, liberty, property and all those who are enjoy-
ing them with us; thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the 
means."
99 
But Jefferson fully understood, as seen in the Chesapeake epi-
sode, that the "law of necessity" did not confer upon the execu-
tive any authority to violate the Constitution or the laws of the 
land. Thus, he was at pains to emphasize that an official who as-
sumes the power to act illegally must seek exoneration from 
Congress: 
The officer who is called to act on this superior ground, does 
indeed risk himself on the justice of the controlling powers of 
the Constitution, and his station makes it his duty to incur 
that risk. But those controlling powers, and his fellow citizens 
generally, are bound to judge [him] according to the circum-
stances under which he acted .... 
. . . The line of discrimination between cases may be diffi-
cult; but the good officer is bound to draw it at his own peril, 
and throw himself on the justice of his country and the recti-
tude of his motives. 100 
By virtue of its status as the nation's lawmaking authority, 
Congress represents, in Jefferson's words, the "controlling 
power" which possesses the capacity to make legal an action 
which was illegal at the time it was undertaken. A presidential 
claim to such authority would eviscerate the concept of legal re-
straint, for the president would be governed solely by his own 
compass; in that event, every question of emergency would be a 
matter of the executive's political interest, discretion and will. 
It is perhaps testimony to Lincoln's commitment to constitu-
tional government that while caught in the clutches of America's 
98. Letter from J.B. Colvin to Jefferson, Sept. 14, 1810, quoted in Wilmerding, 67 
Pol. Sci. Q. at 120 (cited in note 12). 
99. Letter from Jefferson to J.B. Colvin, Sept. 20, 1810, in Jefferson, 12 Writings at 
418 (cited in note 97). 
100. !d. 
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gravest crisis, he nevertheless refrained from laying claim to a 
theory of High Prerogative but, in fact, adhered to the practice 
and tradition of legislative ratification. In the context of defend-
ing the Union after the Confederacy attacked Fort Sumter on 
April 12, 1861, and initiated the Civil War, President Lincoln, it 
is familiar, assumed powers not granted to him by the Constitu-
tion. While Congress was in recess, Lincoln issued proclama-
tions calling forth state militias, suspending the writ of habeas 
corpus, and instituting a blockade on the rebellious states. He 
also spent public funds without congressional authorization. 101 
When Congress convened, Lincoln explained that his actions, 
"whether strictly legal or not, were ventured upon under what 
appeared to be a popular demand and a public necessity, trusting 
then, as now, that Congress would readily ratify them." 102 After 
Congress reviewed the circumstances and concluded that Lin-
coln had acted out of necessity, it passed an act approving, legal-
izing, and making valid all "the acts, proclamations, and orders 
of the President ... as if they had been issued and done under 
the previous express authority and direction of the Congress of 
the United States."103 
The courts have upheld the authority of Congress to grant 
immunity to executive officials who have violated the law in the 
name of emergency. In 1824, in Appollon, the Supreme Court 
for the first time addressed the practice of legislative ratification. 
The Court levied damages against an executive official for the 
seizure of a ship and cargo, despite the fact that he acted on the 
basis of what he perceived to be an emergency. In an opinion 
for a unanimous Court, Justice Joseph Story wrote: 
It may be fit and proper for the government, in the exercise of 
the high discretion confided to the executive, for great public 
purposes, to act on a sudden emergency, or to prevent an ir-
reparable mischief, by summary measures which are not 
found in the text of the laws. Such measures are properly 
matters of state, and if the responsibility is taken, under justi-
fiable circumstances, the Legislature will doubtless apply a 
. d . 104 proper m emmty. 
101. Arthur Schlesinger fairly observed: "No President had ever undertaken such 
sweeping action in the absence of congressional authorization. No President had ever 
challenged Congress with such a massive collection of faits accomplis." Schlesinger, The 
Imperial Presidency at 59 (cited in note 2). 
102. Richardson, 5 Messages at 3225 (July 4, 1861) (cited in note 94). 
103. 12 Stat. 326 (1861). The Court took judicial notice of the retroactive ratification 
in the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863). 
104. The Appal/on, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362,366-67 (1824). 
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In 1863, in the Prize Cases, the Supreme Court upheld the 
blockade of the southern states that had been ordered by Presi-
dent Lincoln in 1861. The Court, in an opinion written by Jus-
tice Robert Grier, held that the "sudden attack" on Fort Sumter 
constituted a state of war which provided constitutional justifica-
tion for the blockade, but 
If it were necessary to the technical existence of a war, that 
it should have a legislative sanction, we find it in almost every 
act passed at the extraordinary session of the Legislature of 
1861 .... And finally, in 1861, we find Congress "ex majore 
cautela," and in anticipation of such astute objections, passing 
an act "approving, legalizing, and making valid all the acts, 
proclamations, and orders of the President ... as if they had 
been issued and done under the previous express authority and 
directions of the Congress of the United States." 
Without admitting that such an act was necessary under the 
circumstances, it is plain that if the President had in any man-
ner assumed powers which it was necessary should have the 
authority or sanction of Congress, that on the well known 
principle of law, "omnis ratihabitio retrotrahitret mandato 
equiparaturo'" this ratification has operated to perfectly cure 
the defect. 1 5 
The Founders provided a solution to the problem of emer-
gency. If the president perceives an acute emergency for which 
there is no legislative provision, he might, by virtue of his high 
station act illegally and then turn to Congress for ratification of 
his measures. But there is nothing in either the text or the archi-
tecture of the Constitution that suggests or even intimates that 
the executive possesses an inherent emergency power to violate 
the law on behalf of the welfare of the nation. 
Yet there is some authority although very little in the way of 
judicial authority-and barely any that can withstand scholarly 
analysis-that will permit the erection of scaffolding to support a 
theory of inherent presidential power. Prior to Youngstown, ad-
vocates of a presidential prerogative adduced three Supreme 
Court cases which purported to locate in the executive an inher-
ent emergency power to improvise legislative initiatives. 
Perhaps the leading case cited by advocates of inherent 
power, In re Neagle, raised the question of whether the U.S. At-
torney General, whose actions are imputable to the president, 
105. 67 U.S. at 670-71. 
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had lawfully assigned a U.S. Deputy Marshall, David Neagle, to 
protect Justice Stephen Field, whose life had been threatened 
while he was on circuit duty in California. 106 The idiosyncratic 
fact pattern was, in the Supreme Court's own words, "of so ex-
traordinary a character that it is not to be expected that mand; 
cases can be found to cite as authority upon the subject."1 7 
David Terry, a 'disappointed litigant, had made violent threats 
against Justice Field. When Terry attacked Justice Field in a rail-
road dining car, he was shot and killed by Deputy Marshall Nea-
gle. Neagle was arrested and held on a charge of murder. Ape-
tition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed on his behalf to the 
United States circuit judge. The evidence established justifiable 
homicide, but the writ could not issue unless Neagle was "in cus-
tody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law of the 
United States." It was thus necessary to demonstrate that Nea-
gle had been performing a duty imposed by national law when 
he killed Terry; otherwise, he would face murder charges in a 
California courtroom. The ultimate issue, then, hinged on 
whether the U.S. Attorney General had lawfully assigned Neagle 
to protect Justice Field. Neagle's attorneys, including the Attor-
ney General, conceded that "[i]t is not pretended that there is 
any single specific statute making it [the Attorney General's] 
duty to furnish this protection.108 
In an artful opinion for the Court, Justice Miller finessed 
the absence of a specific statute. In effect, as a member of the 
Supreme Court, Justice Field was required by national law to 
ride circuit, a duty which assumed the presence of a law that 
provided him with protection in the performance of the duty. At 
this point, Justice Miller assumed that the absence of a statute 
did not imply the absence of a law; federal laws might be 
grounded in a complex of federal legal relations without explicit 
enactment. Miller stated: 
Is this duty [to protect federal officials] limited to the en-
forcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of the United 
States according to their express terms, or does it include the 
rights, duties and obligations growing out of the Constitution 
itself, our international relations, and all the protection im-
plied by the nature of the government under the Constitu-
106. 135 u.s. 1 (1890). 
107. Id. at 56. 
I 08. !d. at 80. 
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tion?" 109 
For the Court, then, the "nature of the government," or the 
structure of the Constitution implied an executive power to pro-
tect federal officers in the performance of their duties. 110 But if 
the duty to protect a Supreme Court Justice was based on fed-
eral law, why did the Federal Marshall require the president's 
authorization to execute it? The execution of the law lay at the 
core of his duties which, in fact, the president was powerless to 
prohibit. And yet the instructions to the Deputy Marshall, from 
the Attorney General, provided the foundation for Justice 
Miller's argument about executive power: "The correspon-
dence ... is sufficient, we think, to warrant the marshall in taking 
the steps which he did take, in making the provisions which he 
did make, for the protection and defence of Mr. Justice Field." 111 
This reasoning, however, suggests that the executive created the 
law that Neagle enforced. Not content to rest its ruling on such a 
slender reed, the Court, in the end, purported to find sufficient 
statutory authority for the marshall's conduct. Congress, it said, 
had vested federal marshalls with the same authority possessed 
by local sheriffs, which the Court found sufficient to justify Nea-
gle's action. This line of reasoning is less than convincing, not 
the least for its circularity. The sheriff would maintain the peace 
by enforcing California laws, while the deputy marshall would 
maintain "the peace of the United States" by enforcing the laws 
of the United States. Justice Lucius Lamar wrote a forceful dis-
sent, joined by Chief Justice Melville Fuller, in which he antici-
pated the Court's opinion in the Steel Seizure Case: The presi-
dent is not constitutionally authorized to make laws, which is the 
exclusive province of Congress. Moreover, the "peace of the 
United States" did not include the execution of the laws of Cali-
fornia. 
While there is little clarity, and even less merit in the 
Court's reasoning, what is clear is that the Court did not recog-
nize a legislative power in the president. But it did want to save 
Neagle from charges of murder and so it improvised a theory 
which concluded that the executive simply enforced a law that 
emerged from the legal structure created by Congress. In re 
Neagle is not the only case that reflects judicial improvisation; 
judicial artistry can often be found behind the hard cases that 
109. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). 
II 0. Id. at 54-58. 
Ill. I d. at 67-68. 
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make bad law. Such is the price to be paid by the Court so that 
it may avoid at all costs any attribution to the president of an in-
herent power to make law. 
In re Debs arose out of the famous Pullman strike of 1894 
which, behind the leadership of Eugene V. Debs, halted trains 
drawing Pullman cars in Chicago. Some violence ensued and the 
result was the physical obstruction of interstate commerce and 
blockage of the mails in the area surrounding Chicago. 112 Presi-
dent Grover Cleveland, over the vigorous protest of the Gover-
nor of Illinois, Peter Altegeld, sent troops to Chicago to restore 
order. At the same time, the U.S. Attorney General sought and 
obtained an injunction in the federal circuit court against Debs 
and other union leaders to cease further interference with the 
mails or with railroads engaged in interstate commerce. The in-
junction was issued on the theory that the Sherman Act had 
been violated, and for defiance of the injunction, the defendants 
were convicted for contempt and sentenced to imprisonment. 
When Debs and his colleagues sought a writ of habeas cor-
pus from the Supreme Court, the Court refused to grant the writ, 
but in its review it ignored the issue of the Sherman Act because, 
in all probability, it did not take seriously the allegation of the 
complaint that the defendants were attempting to assume "the 
entire control of the interstate, industrial and commercial busi-
ness in which the population of the city of Chicago and of the 
other communities" along the lines of the roads were engaged.113 
Moreover, the Court, in an opinion by Justice David Brewer, 
said it preferred to rest its judgment "on the broader ground 
which has been discussed in this opinion, believing it of impor-
tance that the principles underlying it should be fully stated and 
affirmed. "114 
There was no statute that expressly prohibited the alleged 
conduct or authorized the president to seek an injunction. As a 
consequence, the Court might have anticipated the criticism of 
the Steel Seizure Court that the president was enforcing a policy 
of his own creation. But the Court determined that the presi-
dent was enforcing a complex of statutes and constitutional 
norms, which required protection of interstate commerce: "As, 
under the Constitution, power over interstate commerce and the 
transportation of the mails is vested in the national government, 
112. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895). 
113. Id. at567. 
114. Id. at 600. 
184 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:155 
and Congress by virtue of such grant has assumed actual and di-
rect control, it follows that the national government may prevent 
any unlawful and forcible interference therewith." 115 
No one doubted that the "nation" and the "national gov-
ernment" had the power to protect interstate commerce and the 
mail from obstruction, but what were the legal grounds for the 
president's action? The Court observed that Congress might 
have passed a statute making obstruction a criminal act but, it 
asked, "is that the only remedy?" Beyond that, the Court said, 
"[t]he entire strength of the nation may be used," which implied 
that the president might use "the army of the Nation, and all its 
militia" to remove the obstruction to interstate commerce.116 
This reasoning of the Court has been understood to stand 
for the proposition that the president has inherent power to use 
the military against breaches of "the peace of the United States." 
It may be viewed that way, but such a conclusion is gratuitous 
and overly broad. Debs's attorneys conceded the premise, but 
there was statutory authority for President Cleveland's decision 
to deploy the troops, statutory authority that he invoked, al-
though not in a timely manner. Since 1792, with the passage of 
the Militia Act, the president has enjoyed the authority to use 
the military to enforce federal law when the execution of the 
laws of the United States is obstructed in any state by a combina-
tion too powerful to be suppressed by judicial proceedings or by 
the United States Marshal, if this fact is certified by a federal 
judge. But before using military force to prevent such an ob-
struction, the president must by proclamation "command such 
insurgents to disperse, and return peaceably to their respective 
abodes, within a limited time."117 In 1795, the statute was modi-
fied by the elimination of the judicial notice requirement. 118 In 
another modification of the Act in 1807, Congress provided that 
in all cases in which the militia might be summoned for the pur-
pose of suppressing obstruction of the laws of the United States, 
that the president would judge the necessity of employing such 
military force. However, the law retained the requirement that a 
president must first issue a proclamation calling upon the insur-
gents to disperse. When President Cleveland deployed troops to 
break the Pullman Strike over the protest of Governor Altgeld, 
on the altogether unpersuasive claim that the enforcement of 
115. Id. at 581. 
116. Id. at 581,582. 
117. 1 Stat. 264 (1792). 
118. 1 Stat. 424 (1795). 
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federal laws was being obstructed, he forgot to issue the procla-
mation. Cleveland issued the proclamation in compliance with 
the statute five days later, but only after the Governor of Oregon 
reminded him of his duty in a sharp telegram. 
It appears then that President Cleveland was acting on the 
basis of statutory authority, and not on a claim of inherent 
power. Congress had delegated to the president the authority to 
use military force to execute the laws in the face of powerful ob-
structionist forces. There is no reason to believe that the Court 
was intimating the presence of an inherent power to use force 
that conflicted with the constitutional power of Congress to gov-
ern the use of military force. Indeed, even if one embraces the 
concept of a "peace of the United States" that the president has 
a duty to protect, it is a concept that must be viewed in the con-
text of a Constitution that assigns to Congress alone both the 
law-making power and the authority to govern the use of mili-
tary force, unless one invokes the vague notion of an extra-
constitutional emergency power, which the Debs Court avoided 
altogether. And within the context of the Constitution, the claim 
that the president possesses an inherent protective power-
drawn perhaps from some combination of constitutional norms 
and statutory authorizations- to employ the military if necessary 
to execute the laws applies, as we have seen, only when powerful 
obstructionist forces overwhelm the capabilities of the civil proc-
ess. 
In sum, the fact that Congress has exercised its constitu-
tional power to govern the use of militarj force through legisla-
tion statutorily precludes any claim of an inherent presidential 
power to use force to execute the laws. President Cleveland un-
derstood this limitation, for he invoked statutory authority for 
the deployment of troops in response to the Pullman strike. Of 
course, his decision rested on specious reasoning. Governor 
Altgeld, it will be recalled, objected to the use of force on the 
ground that no breakdown in the civil process had occurred. 
What had occurred was hysteria, panic among corporate chiefs, 
captains of industry and the affluent, who believed the strike 
marked the rise of Bolshevism in America. 
There remained in Debs the unresolved question of why the 
Court said that the Attorney General of the United States had 
standing to institute a suit to protect interstate commerce and 
the mails from obstruction when there was no act of Congress 
that prohibited private obstruction of either the mails or inter-
state commerce. Justice Brewer stated the incontestable: the 
186 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:155 
"nation" and "the national government" possess the authority to 
protect interstate commerce and the mails against obstruction. 
Congress had legislative authority to prohibit private acts of ob-
struction in these areas, but it had not acted; the absence of a 
prohibition left the president with nothing to enforce. Justice 
Brewer seemed to say that the executive might create a law to 
protect interstate commerce and the mails which is enforceable 
by an injunction. But the implausibility of his position led 
Brewer, as it had Justice Miller in Neagle, to defend his argu-
ment about executive power with the claim that there was, in-
deed, legislative authority for the injunction. Apparently, the 
private obstruction of highwaxs is a public nuisance, an act which 
the government may enjoin. 19 This argument is unpersuasive, 
but it is at least superior to the claim that the executive might 
improvise a law. The executive power of the president applies to 
the execution of national laws. As we have seen, the president 
may enforce state laws only when the state legislature, or the 
governor if the legislature cannot be convened, requests protec-
tion against domestic violence. Not only was there no such re-
quest in Debs, but, as the Court has noted, the law of nuisance is 
a state law. 120 
For all of the confusion surrounding Debs, at least it may be 
said that the Court attributed no substantive power to the presi-
dent. It did not purport to locate a law-making power in the 
president, but only standing to sue. Even then the injunction 
must be issued by the courts, and not by the president. 
United States v. Midwest Oil Co., decided in 1915, has been 
urged in support of the theory of inherent executive power. 121 
However, there is nothing in the opinion, or even in the dissent 
for that matter, to suggest that the Court embraced this theory. 
Midwest Oil involved an 1897 statute, in which Congress had 
provided that certain government lands containing mineral oils 
were "free and open to occupation, exploration and purchase by 
citizens of the United States [for a nominal fee] ... under regula-
tions prescribed by law." 122 In 1909, the Secretary of the Interior 
warned President Taft that oil lands were being depleted so rap-
idly that the United States would be obliged to repurchase what 
had been its own oil at higher, market prices, and he advised 
suspension of further grants as a conservation measure. Two day 
119. In re Debs, 158 U.S. 591-93. 
120. United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745,769 (1966). 
121. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. 459 (1915). 
122. 29 Stat. 526 (1897) (quoted in Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 566). 
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later, President Taft issued a proclamation and withdrew some 
of the California and Wyoming lands "[i)n aid of" legislation that 
would be proposed.123 Taft's withdrawal order was challenged as 
a violation of the statute. 
In his opinion for the Court, Justice Lamar upheld the with-
drawal order, but based his opinion entirely on statutory 
grounds. Justice Lamar noted that the practice of making with-
drawals dated back to the early days of the republic. More than 
250 executive orders of this kind had been issued, and Congress, 
aware of the practice, tacitly approved of it. Lamar stated: "Its 
silence was acquiescence. Its acquiescence was equivalent to 
consent to continue the practice until the power was revoked by 
some subsequent action by Congress."124 The Court might have 
improved its reasoning by arguing that, under the doctrine of 
"administrative construction" Congress had passed the Act of 
1897 with full knowledge of the executive's interpretation of the 
statute, and that it had tacitly adopted that interpretation. In 
any event, the Court held that Taft had acted on the basis of the 
"implied consent of Congress."125 There was no indication from 
the Court that the president possessed any constitutional author-
ity to order the withdrawal of lands. 
In the spirit of being thorough, there is an obligation to ex-
amine the Court's opinion in Myers v. United States which, al-
though it has lost most of its currency and has been dismissed as 
"an embarrassment to the Supreme Court," purported to iden-
tify in the president an inherent power of removal. 126 
In Myers, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice 
Taft, drew from the president's duty to "take care that the laws 
be faithfully executed," and the so-called "Decision of 1789," the 
conclusion "that as his selection of administrative officers is es-
sential to the execution of the laws by him, so must be his power 
123. Midwest Oil, 236 U.S. at 467. 
124. Id. at 481. The doctrine of administration construction, which represents con-
gressional approval of administrative construction of a statute, precisely because Con-
gress is aware and knowledgeable of the construction, is distinguishable from the claim 
that by virtue of its silence Congress has approved of an administrative act. For a wither-
ing criticism of the practice of drawing legislative consent from its silence, see Joel L. 
Fleishman and Arthur H. Aufses, Law and Orders: The Problem of Presidential Legisla-
tion, 40, No.3, L. & Contemp. Probs. 1,16-19 (Summer, 1976); Paul Gewirtz, The Courts, 
Congress and Executive Policy-Making: Notes on Three Doctrines, id. at 46, 79. 
125. 236 U.S. at 478 
126. Myers, 272 U.S. at 52. For commentary as to why Myers has been viewed as an 
embarrassment," see William Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Inci-
dental Powers of the President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal 
Effect of'The Sweeping Clause,' 36 Ohio St. L.J. 788,803 (1975). 
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of removing those for whom he can not continue to be responsi-
ble."127 The 1789 congressional debate involved the question of 
the president's power to remove the Secretary of Foreign Af-
fairs, but Taft deduced from the debate an unlimited presidential 
power of removal that extended to all executive officers.128 This 
broad interpretation of an executive removal power which, as 
Louis Fisher has pointed out, is "too broad, in fact, to withstand 
scholarly analysis and subsequent Court holdings," represented a 
departure from Taft's previous opinion in 1922 in Wallace v. 
United States. 129 In Wallace, he held that "at least in the absence 
of restrictive legislation, the President, though he could not ap-
point without the consent of the Senate, could remove without 
such consent in the case of any officer whose tenure was not 
fixed by the Constitution."130 In Myers, Taft determined that an 
act of Congress which required the advice and consent of the 
Senate as a precondition to the removal of a postmaster was an 
unconstitutional interference with the president's "unrestricted 
power." 131 Reliance on the Decision of 1789, as Dean Alfange 
has observed, "seems greatly misplaced." 132 "[T]he record in 
1789," as Louis Fisher has justly noted, "reveals deep divisions 
among members of the House and close votes on the Senate 
side. Moreover, many of the legislators supported presidential 
power because the office in question was Secretary of Foreign 
Affairs, an agent of the President and executive in nature. There 
was no reason why that principle had to be extended to postmas-
ters."133 There is merit in the argument that the president should 
not be required to retain a department head in whom he has lost 
confidence, for, as Professor Alfange has pointed out, "that 
would severely interfere with his ability to make and execute 
policies in areas in which he has discretion to do so. Yet very 
few executive officials work so closely with the President or are 
responsible for insuring that the President's political discretion is 
made effective. Many, in fact, are statutorily assigned duties and 
responsibilities with which the President has no power to inter-
127. Myers, 272 U.S. at 117 
128. Id. at 134. 
129. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President at 62 (cited 
in note 2) 
130. Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541, 544 (1922) (emphasis added). The de-
bate in the House of Representatives is conveniently summarized in Louis Fisher, Consti-
tutional Conflicts Between Congress and the President at 60-66 (cited in note 2). 
131. Myers, 272 U.S. at 134. 
132. Dean Alfange, Jr., The Supreme Court and the Separation of Powers: A Wel-
come Return to Normalcy? 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 668, 696 (1990). 
133. Fisher, Constitutional Conflicts at 61 (cited in note 2). 
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fere. And it is here that Congress's power to control by legisla-
tion the activity of the executive branch becomes most clear. "134 
Chief Justice Taft's assertion of an unlimited removal power 
as a derivative of the Take Care Clause suffers from similar in-
firmities. We have known, at least since Marbury v. Madison, 
that Congress may impose statutory duties and responsibilities 
on members of the executive branch beyond control of the ex-
ecutive. It follows, therefore, as the Court noted in 1838 in 
Kendall v. United States, that not "every officer in every branch 
of [the executive) department is under the exclusive direction of 
the President."13 However, if not every executive officer "is un-
der the exclusive direction of the President," then Taft's reason-
ing in Myers that the president must, as a matter of constitu-
tional principle, possess an "unrestricted power" of removal over 
every executive officer is insupportable. Taft recognized the un-
tenability of his position, but anomaly drove him to a remote 
outpost of judicial reasoning. He said that although 
[T]here may be duties so peculiarly and specifically commit-
ted to the discretion of a particular officer as to raise a ques-
tion whether the President may overrule or revise the officer's 
interpretation of his statutory duty in a particular instance .... 
[E]ven in such a case [the executive) may consider the deci-
sion after its rendition as a reason for removing the officer, on 
the ground that the discretion regularly entrusted to that offi-
cer by statute has not been on the whole intelligently or wisely 
exercised. Otherwise he does not discharge his own constitu-
tional duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed." 136 
Taft's reasoning seems to mean that while Congress may by stat-
ute vest duties and responsibilities in an executive officer, the 
executive may remove that official for performance of the statu-
tory duties. Therefore, Taft seems to conclude that: the presi-
dent's duty to faithfully execute the laws imRlies the "power to 
insure that they are not faithfully executed."1 7 It is little wonder 
that the Myers opinion has been described as an "embarrass-
ment" to the Court, and it is unsurprising as well that it was 
overturned less than a decade later in Humphrey's Executor v. 
United States. 138 
134. Alfange, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 696 (cited in note 132). 
135. Kendall v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524,610 (1838). 
136. Myers, 272 U.S. at 135. 
137. Alfange, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 697 (cited in note 132). 
138. 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935). 
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For all of its failings and deficiencies, at least the doctrine of 
inherent power perceives presidential power as constitutionally 
limited. There is but a single decision- United States v. Curtiss-
Wright Exp. Corp.-that attempts to adduce an extra-
constitutional basis for presidential action.139 Curtiss-Wright 
gave rise to the narrow issue of the constitutionality of a joint 
resolution that authorized President Franklin D. Roosevelt to 
prohibit the sale of arms to Bolivia and Paraguay, then involved 
in armed conflict in Chaco, if it would "contribute to the re-
establishment of peace between those countries."140 The Court, 
in an opinion by Justice George Sutherland, upheld the delega-
tion against the charge that it was overly broad. Sutherland, 
however, strayed from the delegation question and, in some in-
defensible dicta, imparted an unhappy legacy- the theory that 
the external sovereignty of the nation is vested in the executive, 
and not derived from the Constitution. 
Sutherland's theory of inherent presidential power stems 
from his bizarre reading of Anglo-American legal history. Ac-
cording to Southerland, domestic and foreign affairs are differ-
ent, "both in respect of their origin and their nature." The "do-
mestic or internal affairs" are leashed by constitutional 
limitations. But authority over foreign affairs is not contingent 
upon constitutional grants since the powers of external sover-
eignty "passed from the Crown not to the colonies severally, but 
to the colonies in their collective and corporate capacity as the 
United States of America." 141 Sutherland's historical excursion 
is without grounded in history. Scholars have exposed the pov-
erty of his thesis by demonstrating that in 1776 states were sov-
ereign entities. Conclusive evidence is found in the Articles of 
Confederation, approved by the Continental Congress in No-
vember 1777 and ratified in March 1781. Article II of that gov-
erning document stated: "Each State retains its Sovereignty, 
freedom and independence, and every power ... which is not ... 
expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assem-
bled." Moreover, in Article III, it was provided, "The said states 
hereby severally enter into a firm league of friendship with each 
other, for their common defense .... "Finally, Article IX stated: 
139. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). This discussion is drawn from Adler, Court, Constitution 
and Foreign Affairs, in Adler and George, The Constitution and the Conduct of American 
Foreign Policy at 19-56 (cited in note 2), and Adler, Warmaking at 29-35, (cited in note 
3). 
140. 299 u.s. 304, 312. 
141. Id. at 315-16. 
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"The United States in Congress assembled, shall have the sole 
and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and 
war ... [and of ] entering into treaties and alliances. "142 Those 
provisions make it pellucidly clear that the states entered into a 
"league of friendship"; they did not attempt to create a "sover-
eign" or "corporate" body. Indeed, the thirteen sovereign states, 
"which emerged from the principles of the Revolution," reluc-
tantly delegated powers to the Continental Congress. This reluc-
tance, Randolph explained to the Constitutional Convention, 
was attributable to the "jealousy of the states with regard to 
their sovereignty."143 Thus the "states, in their highest sovereign 
capacity," expressly delegated powers to the Continental Con-
gress, including the enumeration of Article IX, of the war and 
treaty powers, the specific assignment of which, by itself, is dev-
astating to Southerland's historical thesis. 144 
Even if we were to assume that the power of external sover-
eignty had been by some method transferred directly from the 
Crown to the Union, it remains to be explained why that power 
would be vested in the president. As Justice Felix Frankfurter 
observed in Youngstown, "[T]he fact that power exists in the 
Government does not vest it in the President."145 In fact, the 
Supreme Court has ruled on several occasions that the sovereign 
power in foreign affairs is held by Congress. 146 At any rate, 
there is nothing in Sutherland's theory that would explain the lo-
cation of this power in the presidency. 
Finally, Sutherland's claim that the conduct of foreign pol-
icy is not restricted by the Constitution. James Madison made it 
clear that foreign relations powers, like domestic powers, are de-
rived from the Constitution when he wrote in Federalist 45 that 
"the powers delegated by the proposed Constitution are few and 
142. See, e.g., Charles Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: 
An Historical Reassessment, 83 Yale L.J. 1, 3-5 (1973); David M. Levitan, The Foreign 
Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland's Theory, 55 Yale L.J. 467 (1946). 
143. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,470 (1793) (Jay, C.J.); Farrand, 1 Re-
cords at 19 (cited in note 44). 
144. In Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 675, 720 (1838), the Court 
held that as a result of the revolution, the authority of the Crown and parliament devoted 
on the "states in their highest sovereign capacity," Raoul Berger has observed that the 
grant to Congress of the warrnaking and treaty powers "alone undermines Southerland's 
historical premise that these powers were derived from 'some other source' than the sev-
eral states." Raoul Berger, The President's Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 
75 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591-94 (1980). 
145. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 604. 
146. See Chae Chan Ping v. United States (Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 
603-04 (1889); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44,57 (1958). 
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defined . . . [they] will be exercised principally on external ob-
jects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce."147 In 
addition, we we have seen, there is nothing in the Convention 
debates to suggest even the slightest flirtation with the theory of 
an undefined reservoir of presidential power. 
Since Curtiss-Wright the Court consistently has reaffirmed 
the principle that government powers are grounded in the Con-
stitution. In the Steel Seizure case, Justice Hugo L. Black, speak-
ing for the Court, delivered a weighty rebuke to the assertion of 
extraconstitutional "executive power."148 And Justice Jackson 
sharply dismissed Sutherland's discussion of inherent presiden-
tial power as mere "dictum."149 In Reid v. Covert, the Court re-
jected the claim that the exercise of foreign policy authority is 
beyond the reach of the Constitution's due process clauses. 150 In 
his opinion for the Court, Black stated: "The United States is en-
tirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority 
have no other source. It can only act in accordance with all the 
limitations imposed by the Constitution."151 
On the eve of the Steel Seizure Case, there was nothing in 
the annals of Supreme Court decisions that sustained a theory of 
emergency power that would justify presidential violation of 
constitutional provisions, and no decision that even looked in 
that direction, for such an opinion would scuttle our jurispru-
dence. As we have seen, however, courts had on occasion per-
formed feats of improvisation in order to sustain presidential ac-
tion, but those contortions speak volumes for the judiciary's 
recognition of the central importance of executive subordination 
to the rule of law. Even the grave legal and constitutional crises 
that arose from the Civil War, including President Lincoln's self-
confessed illegal actions, were viewed, treated and resolved 
through constitutional mechanisms. Some of Lincoln's actions-
the suspension of habeas corpus, for example-were denounced 
by courts, and not sanctioned in the name of necessity or emer-
gency. Other military actions were sustained by courts that took 
judicial notice of the fact that Congress passed legislation con-
ferring retroactive authorization on Lincoln's actions, which 
made his illegal acts legal. This principle of retroactive authori-
zation, which was drawn from English legal history during our 
147. Federalist 45 (Madison) 298, 303 (cited in note 65). 
148. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 587. 
149. Id. at 635-36. 
150. 354 u.s. 1 (1957). 
151. Id. at 5-6. 
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founding period primarily, it should be said, for its virtue in rec-
ognizing and ensuring the principle that the legislature shall re-
main the lawmaker, maintains a semblance of constitutional 
government. And while not a perfect legal tool for the rationali-
zation of unconstitutional actions, the only available alternative 
rationalization is the doctrine of necessity, a rationale that is for-
eign to our constitutional system, for it would exalt the executive 
abuse above the rule of law. Justice Jackson, in the Steel Seizure 
case, rejected the argument of necessity, the assertion that emer-
gency situations license the executive to meet them as he 
pleases, for " [ s ]uch power either has no beginning or it has no 
end." 152 
From the beginning, the courts had held that the executive 
is bound by the law, and powerless to circumvent it, a judicial 
legacy that echoes James Wilson's observation that, "the most 
powerful magistrate should be amenable to the law ... No one 
should be secure while he violates the constitution and the 
laws." 153 Moreover, the president's acts, which must be grounded 
in either constitutional or legislative authorization, are within 
the compass of judicial review. In Marbury v. Madison, William 
Marbury sued the Secretary of State in his capacity as custodian 
of records in order to obtain a commission as justice of the peace 
for the District of Columbia; the commission had been duly 
signed by President John Adams before he left office. As part of 
his statutory obligations, it was supposed that the Secretary of 
State, James Madison, was required to deliver the commission to 
Marbury. Chief Justice Marshall agreed that, "a mere political 
act, belonging to the executive department alone, for the per-
formance of which entire confidence is placed by our constitu-
tion in the supreme executive," ... could not be controlled by 
statute, but added that not "every act of duty, to be performed in 
any of the ~reat departments of government, constitutes such a 
case .... "15 When discretionary political powers are exercised, 
the acts of a subordinate executive officer are the president's 
acts, "and whatever opinion may be entertained of the manner 
in which executive discretion may be used, still there exists, and 
can exist, no power to control that discretion." However, Mar-
shall declared: "[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on 
that officer other duties; when he is directed peremptorily to 
152. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 653. 
153. James Wilson, 1 The Works of James Wilson 425 (Robert Greeb McCloskey, 
ed., The Belknap Press of Harvard U. Press, 1967). 
154. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 164 
194 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:155 
perform certain acts; . . . he is so far the officer of the law; is 
amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discre-
tion sport away the vested rights of others. "155 Therefore, the 
president could not lawfully interfere with the Secretary's per-
formance of his statutory duty, and it was presumed that he had 
not done so. Marbury was entitled to his commission. The ra-
tionale behind the prohibition on presidential interference with 
an executive officer's performance of his statutory responsibility, 
has been ably supplied by Dean Alfange Jr.: "If the President 
has the constitutional authority, as the person to whom the 'ex-
ecutive power' is vested by the Constitution, to instruct any ex-
ecutive officer to disregard statutory obligations, then the power 
to 'take care that the laws be faithfully executed' includes the 
power to insure that they are not faithfully executed."156 That 
cannot be the meaning of the Constitution, but if it were, "no 
barrier would remain to the executive ignoring any and all Con-
gressional authorization."157 In 1804, in Little v. Barreme, Chief 
Justice Marshall held invalid a presidential order to seize a ship 
contrary to the terms of a law passed by Congress. 158 In 1806, in 
United States v. Smith, Justice William Paterson, who had been a 
member of the Constitutional Convention, wrote an opinion 
while riding circuit, and declared: "The president of the United 
States cannot control the statute, nor dispense with its execution, 
and still less can he authorize a person to do what the law for-
bids.159 
The principle affirmed in Marbury that the president may 
not forbid an officer to perform a duty imposed upon him b~ 
Congress, was reaffirmed in 1838, in Kendall v. United States. 1 
In Kendall, the Court ruled that the Postmaster General, Amos 
Kendall, could be required by statute to pay the full amount that 
a government contractor claimed was owed him for services pro-
vided, despite an order from President Jackson forbidding 
Kendall from paying the bill. The Court, in an opinion by Chief 
Justice Roger Taney, reiterated the distinction between the 
power of the president in the political matters in which he was 
vested with discretionary authority under the Constitution, and 
155. Id. at 166. 
156. Alfange, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 697 (cited in note 132). 
157. Wormuth and Firinage, To Chain the Dog of War at 163 (cited in note 3). 
158. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804). 
159. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1230 (C.C.D.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342). 
160. 37 U.S. 524 (1838). 
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other matters in which legal obligations were imposed by Con-
gress on executive officers. Taney wrote that 
it would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose 
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, 
which is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by 
the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility 
grow out of and are subject to the control of the law, and not 
h d . . f h .d 161 to t e uectwn o t e pres1 ent. 
And he added, emphatically, "[t]o contend that the obligation 
imposed on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, im-
plies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of 
the constitution, and entirely inadmissible."162 
It would seem beyond dispute that presidential power is cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution. But constitutional limitations 
often have been challenged by assertive presidents in pursuit of 
political goals and policy agendas. This certainly was true of the 
Truman Administration, which not only held a capacious view of 
the executive powers, but which undertook to exercise those 
powers in an extravagant manner that surpassed previous claims 
of presidential power. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
The refusal of Congress to adopt an amendment to the Taft-
Hartley Act that would have authorized presidential seizure of 
private property in emergencx cases framed President Truman's 
assertion of inherent power. 63 "The authoritatively expressed 
purpose of Congress to disallow such power from the President," 
wrote Justice Felix Frankfurter, "could not be more decisive if it 
had been written into . . . the Labor Management Relations 
Act." 164 In effect, Congress had imposed a statutory prohibition 
161. ld. at 610. 
162. Id. at 612. 
163. The Taft-Hartley Act provided an alternative to the seizure or condemnation of 
property. Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 176-180,61 Stat. 136 (1947). 
During the debate in Congress, Sen. Robert Taft stated: "We did not feel that we should 
put into the law, as part of the collective-bargaining machinery, an ultimate resort to 
compulsory arbitration, or to seizure, or to any other action." 93 Cong. Rec. S3835 (daily 
ed, Apr. 23, 1947). An effort to add seizure authority to the Act was defeated. Id. at 
3637-45. 
164. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 602. Justice Jackson agreed: "Congress has not left 
seizure of private property an open field but has covered it by three statutory policies 
inconsistent with this seizure." Id. at 639. Justice Burton stated: "Congress ... has pre-
scnbed for the President specific procedures, exclusive of seizure, for ... meeting the 
present type of emergency." Id. at 660. Justice Clark added: "where Congress has laid 
196 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 19:155 
on executive seizure. It bears reminder then that Truman did 
not adduce an inherent power in support of the less ambitious 
proposition that the president enjoys a residual power to act in 
the absence of legislation, but on behalf of the bolder contention 
that the executive possesses, in Lockean terms, a prerogative 
power to act "against legislative prescription." 
Truman's assertion of an inherent power-essentially a 
claim to improvise legislation-found sympathy in Chief Justice 
Fred Vinson's dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Stanley 
Reed and Sherman Minton. Vinson's dissent followed a two-
track approach; he advanced constitutional text and history, but 
in each case, as we shall see, his arguments found an effective an-
tagonist in Justice Frankfurter. Vinson's first effort involved an 
effort to employ the Take Care Clause. He noted that Congress 
had engaged the nation in various military programs pursuant to 
U.S. foreign relations interests: The Truman Plan, the Marshall 
Plan and the Mutual Security Act of 1951; it had reinstituted the 
draft and had passed substantial funding measures for national 
security and defense; the president had taken the nation into the 
Korean War; and the Senate had approved the United Nations 
Charter, the North Atlantic Treaty and other defense pacts. 165 
Vinson declared: "The President has the duty to execute the 
foregoing legislative programs. Their successful execution de-
pends upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices 
for steel."166 Accordingly, the president might seize the steel in-
dustry and maintain production. Chief Justice Vinson's argu-
ment approximated the argument promoted in Neagle and Debs. 
The Court's opinion in Midwest Oil was not helpful, and so he 
mined the government's brief in that case and quoted liberally 
from its reasoning and passages on the ground that it was "valu-
able because of the caliber of its authors," 167 one of whom, ironi-
cally, had been Solicitor General John W. Davis, who appeared 
before the Court in Youngstown on behalf of the steel compa-
nies.168 The government's brief in Midwest Oil had, in fact, ad-
duced a theory of inherent executive power. 
down specific procedures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, he 
must follow those procedures." ld. at 662. 
165. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 667-72. 
166. ld. at 672. 
167. I d. at 693. 
168. Id. There is further irony to be found in the fact that Justice Jackson had to face 
arguments that he had developed as Attorney General on behalf of President Franklin 
Roosevelt that were contrary to his opinion in Youngstown. See infra, text accompany-
ing notes 222-223. 
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There was, as Vinson himself noted, no "specific statute au-
thorizing seizure of the steel mills as a mode of executing the 
laws .... "169 But the "absence of a specific statute,"170 he rea-
soned, did not prevent the president from executing the "mass of 
legislation"171 in accordance with his duties under the Take Care 
Clause, "as he sees fit without reporting the mode of execution 
to Congress .... "172 The sole purpose of President Truman's ac-
tion, Vinson wrote, was "to faithfully execute the laws by acting 
in an emergency to maintain the status quo, thereby preventing 
collapse of the legislative programs until Congress could act. "173 
In his effort to save Truman's seizure of the steel mills, 
Francis D. Wormuth explained, Chief Justice Vinson sought "to 
invent a second necessary and proper clause. According to the 
Constitution, Congress may pass all laws necessary and proper 
for carrying into effect its delegated powers; according to Vin-
son, the President may pass all laws necessary and groper for 
carrying into effect policies endorsed by Congress." 4 But as 
Vinson recognized, his course faced an insuperable obstacle in 
the shape and form of the majority's embrace of a fundamental 
constitutional principle that Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes had 
articulated in his famous dissent in Myers v. United States: "The 
duty of the President to see that the laws be executed is a duty 
that does not go beyond the laws or require him to achieve more 
than Congress sees fit to leave within his power."175 Chief Jus-
tice Vinson's argument that the president might execute legisla-
tive programs by measures quite beyond the enforcement 
scheme envisioned by Congress amounts to the proposition that 
inherent executive power carries with it an inherent legislative 
power. But such a proposition would eviscerate the doctrine of 
separation of powers and deprive Congress of its fundamental 
legislative power. "Even if one concedes," as Professor David 
Currie has observed, "that the President may not be limited 
strictly to enforcement methods spelled out by statute, however, 
a line must be drawn somewhere if anything is to remain of the 
principle that only Congress shall make the laws."176 The ques-
169. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 702. 
172. Id. at 703. 
173. Id. 
174. Francis D. Wormuth, The Nixon Theory of the War Power: A Critique, 60 Cal. 
L. Rev. 623, 672 (1972). 
175. 272U.S.atl77. 
176. David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme Court: The Second Century, 
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tion remains: which branch of government is vested with the au-
thority to draw that line? Justice Holmes's view, which echoed 
the Framers' conception of executive power, was clear enough: 
the executive power is a power and a duty to execute the laws, 
and the president is dependent upon Congress for the means to 
execute the laws. But Chief Justice Vinson would allow the 
president, under guise of an "emergency power," to improvise 
the scheme of enforcement and the point of distinction between 
legislative and executive power. This surely is a doctrine based 
on shifting sands. Paul Kauper rightly stated: "Perhaps in a time 
of emergency it might appear appropriate to conscript man-
power for industry, to levy additional taxes to finance the legisla-
tive program, to impose more severe penalties on those who vio-
late the laws. But it would hardly be contended that presidential 
prerofiative would extend to these areas of legislative author-
ity."1 Although one may hope with Kauper that no president 
would contend that, as a matter of prerogative, the executive 
might, among other actions, levy taxes, such is the mischief in-
herent in the concept of a presidential emergency power that we 
are entitled to ask about its limitations. Chief Justice Vinson 
denied that President Truman's seizure of the steel mills was an 
exercise in "unlimited executive power"178 but, in any case, he 
determined that the governing standard for presidential imple-
mentation of statutory schemes was simply left to the president's 
discretionary authority-"as the he sees fit." 179 
A presidential claim, like Truman's, of authority to impro-
vise legislation to substitute for legislation passed by Congress 
amounts to an assertion of a power to revise the Constitution. 
By what authority may a president lay claim to a revisory 
power? By what transformational means may a president en-
gage in an act of self-conferral of the legislative authority? Even 
Alexander Hamilton, the darling of executive enthusiasts for his 
advocacy of a "strong" presidency, nevertheless stated that "a 
delegated authority cannot alter the constituting act, unless so 
expressly authorized by the constituting power. An agent cannot 
new-model his cornrnission." 180 An effort by the executive to ex-
pand his authority without resort to the people attempts to cir-
1888-1986 at 368 (U. of Chicago Press, 1990). 
177. Kauper, 51 Mich. L. Rev. at 181 (cited in note 12). 
178. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 701. 
179. Id. at 703. 
180. Alexander Hamilton, 6 The Works of Alexander Hamilton 166 (Henry Cabot 
Lodge, ed., G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1904). 
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cumvent the Constitution's amendatory clause. What is at stake 
here is nothing less than the rule of law, the very marrow of 
which consists of presidential subordination to the Constitution. 
The executive is a creature of the Constitution and has only that 
power granted to it by the Constitution;181 it may not undertake 
actions which it is not authorized to undertake and it must not 
do what it is forbidden to do. President Truman's claim to an 
emergency power to override what in Justice Frankfurter's opin-
ion was a congressional prohibition on executive seizure of 
property ignores Article V and substitutes an amendment by 
presidential revision for the solemn deliberation of Congress and 
the people, as required by the amendatory machinery. Hamilton 
stated in Federalist No. 78: "Until the people have, by some sol-
emn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established 
form, it is binding upon themselves collectively, as well as indi-
vidually; and no presumption, or even knowledge, of their sen-
timents, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, 
prior to such an act." 182 
At its foundation, President Truman's claim of a revisory 
authority, to borrow from Edward S. Corwin, sought "to set 
aside, not a particular clause of the Constitution, but its most 
fundamental characteristic, its division of power between Con-
gress and the President, and thereby gather into his own hands 
the combined power of both."183 The fusion of the legislative 
and executive powers, it is familiar, was antithetical to the Fram-
ers' perception of the principal virtue of the doctrine of separa-
tion of powers-the prevention of oppression, and even tyr-
anny.184 As Madison explained in Federalist No. 48, since 
"power is of an encroaching nature ... it ought to be effectually 
restrained from passing the limits assigned to it." 185 But limita-
181. In Reid v. Covert, Justice Black wrote for the Court: "The United States is en· 
tirely a creature of the Constitution. Its power and authority have no other source. It 
can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution." 354 
U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957). 
182. Federalist 78 (Hamilton) 502, 509 (cited in note 65). James Iredell stated: 
"Where any act of the government is performed, it is not an act of the government 
merely, but in reality an act of the people whose trustee the government is. . . . [The 
government's] powers ... all originate from a system the people themselves have agreed 
to be governed by, and derive the whole of their validity from such system voluntarily 
established." Griffith J. McKee, 2 Life and Correspondence of James Iredel/411·12 (Pe-
ter Smith, 1949). 
183. EdwardS. Corwin, Total War and the Constitution 65 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1947). 
184. Justice Black stated: "Ours is a government of divided authority on the assump-
tion that in division there is not only strength but freedom from tyranny." Reid v. Covert, 
354U.S.at40. 
185. Federalist 48 (Madison) 321 (cited in note 65). 
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tions imposed by the Constitution, primarily erected by the 
enumeration of powers, are reduced to mere parchment by the 
proposition of a presidential revisory power that redistributes 
the powers allocated by the Constitution. Fortunately, Ameri-
can law has not adopted such a mischievous proposition. In 
1935, in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, Chief Justice 
Charles Evans Hughes wrote for the Court: "Extraordinarl con-
ditions do not create or enlarge Constitutional power."18 Nor 
does the desire for an additional power-even a presidential 
emergency power-create it. As Madison said of the treaty 
power, "Had the power of making treaties, for example, been 
omitted, however necessary it might have been, the defect could 
only have been lamented, or supplied by an amendment of the 
constitution."187 Justice Frankfurter reaffirmed Madison's ob-
servation in his concurring opinion in Youngstown: 
The utmost that the Korean conflict may imply is that it may 
have been desirable to have given the President further au-
thority, a freer hand in these matters. Absence of authority in 
the President to deal with a crisis does not imply want of 
power in the Government. Conversely the fact that power ex-
ists in the Government does not vest it in the President. The 
need for new legislation does not enact it. Nor does it repeal 
d . . 1 188 or amen ex1stmg aw. 
Chief Justice Vinson's second argument in support of Presi-
dent Truman's seizure of the steel industry involved historical 
practice. He asserted the existence of a substantial record of 
presidential seizures of property as an exercise not only of ex-
ecutive leadership, but of the president's duty to faithfully exe-
cute the laws of the land, with or without legislative authoriza-
tion. Vinson contended that the record included actions by the 
likes of George Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. 
Roosevelt. 189 Justice Frankfurter proved, again, to be formida-
ble nemesis. After a comprehensive review and examination of 
the record, Frankfurter concluded: "Down to the World War II 
period, then, the record is barren of instances comparable to the 
one before us."19° Frankfurter added to his opinion a lengthy 
appendix that summarized the instances of seizures of industrial 
plants by the President, from the Civil War through World War 
186. 295 U.S. at528. 
187. 1 Annals of Cong. 503 [1789]1834. 
188. 343 U.S. at 603-04. 
189. Id. at 683-700. 
190. ld. at 612. 
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11. 191 His thorough analysis ably demonstrated that there were 
only three "executive assertions of the power of seizure in cir-
cumstances comparable to the present" which were "in the six-
month period from June to December of 1941."192 Frankfurter, 
however, determined, "[w]ithout passing on their validity ... 
that these three isolated instances do not add up, either in num-
ber, scope, duration or contemporaneous legal justification" to 
adduce support for Truman's seizure of the steel industry. 193 
Chief Justice Vinson's theory of an inherent presidential 
power was rejected by the six justices who formed a majority. In 
his opinion for the Court, which was grounded in separation of 
powers principles, Justice Hugo Black justly stated: 
The President's power, if any, to issue the order must stem ei-
ther from an act of Congress or from the Constitution itself. 
There is no statute that expressly authorizes the President to 
take possession of property as he did here. Nor is there any 
act of Congress to which our attention has been directed from 
which such a power can fairly be implied. Indeed, we do not 
understand the Government to rely on statutory authorization 
for this seizure. 194 
Since the president lacked statutory authorization, according to 
Black, the necessary authority "must be found in some provision 
of the Constitution."195 But as Black noted, Truman had "not 
claimed that express constitutional language grants this power to 
the President. The contention is that presidential power should 
be implied from the aggregate of his powers under the Constitu-
tion," with "particular reliance" on the Vesting Clause, the Take 
Care Clause and the Commander in Chief Clause. 196 Justice 
Black easily disposed of the commander-in-chief argumene 97 
and trained his sights on the president's assertion of an inherent 
power: 
Nor can the seizure order be sustained because of the sev-
eral constitutional provisions that grant executive power to 
the President. In the framework of our Constitution, the 
President's power to see that the laws are faithfully executed 
refutes the idea that he is to be a lawmaker. The Constitution 
191. Id. at 620-28. 
192. Id. at 613. 
193. Id. 
194. Id. at 585. 
195. Id. at 587. 
196. Id. 
197. Id. 
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limits his functions in the lawmaking process to the recom-
mending of laws he thinks wise and the vetoing of laws he 
thinks bad. And the Constitution is neither silent nor equivo-
cal about who shall make laws which the President is to exe-
cute.198 
Justice Black rightly noted that the president may not dis-
place the legislative acts of Congress. Manifestly, the Constitu-
tional Convention stripped the executive of the prerogative 
powers to suspend and dispense with the enforcement of laws 
when it adopted the Take Care Clause. A presidential power to 
displace the laws of Congress, moreover, would constitute a rank 
act of usurpation,199 and mortally wound the principle of separa-
tion of powers which insists that the nation should be governed 
by known rules of law. That principle can be maintained, how-
ever, only if those who make the law have no power to execute it 
and those who execute it have no power to make it?00 But that 
critical distinction would be eviscerated by an inherent executive 
power. 
Justice Black's opinion has been disparaged as "oversimpli-
fied,"201 but while other members of the majority disagreed with 
his approach they nonetheless agreed that President Truman 
possessed no inherent executive power to displace congressional 
control of the authority to seize property. It is true that Black's 
opinion lacks the dexterity of Justice Robert H. Jackson's con-
currinS opinion, but that approach, too, is vulnerable to criti-
cism.2 In fact, there is considerable merit in Black's "clear con-
ceptual categories of legal and illegal executive activity,"203 and it 
avoided the rigid formalism of separation of powers decisions 
198. Id. 
199. To calm fears of usurpation, James Iredell, a leader in the North Carolina Rati-
fying Convention and later a Justice of the Supreme Court, said that "if congress under 
pretense of executing one power, should, in fact usurp another they will violate the con-
stitution" Elliot, 4 Debates at 184 (cited in note 66). 
200. For a discussion of this point see Wormuth, Origins at 65-66 (cited in note 33). 
201. Schwartz, A Commentary on the Constitution of the United States: Part 1: The 
Powers of the Government at 68-69 (cited in note 30). 
202. While praising Jackson's opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 
(1981), the Court, nonetheless criticized his tripartite analysis of executive power: "ex-
ecutive action ... falls, not neatly in one of three pigeonholes, but rather at some point 
along a spectrum running from explicit congressional authorization to explicit congres-
sional prohibition." Id. at 669. See also Jules Lobel, Emergency Power and the Decline 
of Liberalism, 98 Yale L.J. 1385, 1410-12 (1989); Laurence Tribe, American Constitu-
tional Law 239-41 (Foundation Press, 2d ed. 1988); Abner S. Greene, Checks and Bal-
ances in an Era of Presidential Lawmaking, 61 U. Chi. L. Rev. 123, 190-93 (1994). 
203. Lobel, 98 Yale L.J. at 1410-11 (cited in note 202). 
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delivered by the Burger Court.Z04 There is, after all, a difference 
between the Burger Court's conversion of the dictionary into a 
jurisprudential fortress,205 and Justice Black's adhesion to the 
over-arching principle of separation of powers, which enjoys the 
additional advantage of enumeration of powers in the Constitu-
tion. There is, moreover, no reason to confuse Black's argument 
that the Constitution prohibits the executive from "legislating" 
with the familiar practice of presidential proclamations, subordi-
nate rule-making and, of course, executive orders, since those 
executive regulations are subordinate to the statutor~ authority 
of Congress and thus subject to analytical distinction.2 6 
Justice Frankfurter wrote a concurring opinion in which he, 
too, repudiated Truman's claim to an inherent power to seize the 
steel industry. Justice Frankfurter noted his concurrence in Jus-
tice Black's opinion because he agreed that separation of powers 
principles governed the circumstances of the case, although he 
believed that the considerations relevant to the enforcement of 
the doctrine seemed "more complicated and flexible" than ap-
peared in Black's opinion.207 While Frankfurter explained that 
the application of the separation of powers doctrine may engen-
der differences in "attitude" and "nuance,"208 he was neverthe-
less on all fours in his agreement with Black that the Constitu-
tion vested in Congress the full authority to order a seizure of 
property: "In any event, nothing can be plainer than that Con-
gress made a conscious choice of policy in a field full of perplex-
ity and peculiarly within legislative responsibility for choice."209 
And that "choice," as Frankfurter explained, was manifested by 
Congress in its refusal to amend the Taft-Hartley Act for the 
purpose of empowering the president to seize an "industry in 
which there is an impending curtailment of production. "210 
Frankfurter stated: "On a balance of considerations, Congress 
chose not to lodge this power in the President. "211 As a conse-
quence, the president had no authority to "act in disregard of the 
204. For an excellent discussion of the formalism of the Burger Court decision see, 
generally, Alfange, 58 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. at 722-40 (cited in note 132). 
205. Judge Learned Hand observed that it is "one of the purest indexes of a mature 
and developed jurisprudence not to make a fortress out of the dictionary." Cabell v. 
Markham, 148 F.2d 737, 739 (1945). 
206. For a fine discussion of executive orders, sec Kenneth R. Mayer, With the 
Stroke of a Pen: Executive Orders and Presidential Power (Princeton U. Press, 2001). 
207. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 589. 
208. Id. 
209. Id. at 602. 
210. Id. at601, quoting 93 Cong. Rec. 3637-45. 
211. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 601. 
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limitation put upon seizure" in the Taft-Hartley Act.212 More-
over, as we have seen, Frankfurter reaffirmed his denial of an 
inherent executive power by adopting Justice Holmes's opinion 
that in the performance of his duty to faithfully execute the laws, 
the president is dependent upon Congress to determine the en-
forcement scheme. 
In a separate opinion, Justice William 0. Douglas an-
nounced his concurrence in Justice Black's application of the 
separation of powers doctrine. Douglas believed that there had 
been an emergency but "the fact that it was necessary that 
measures be taken to keep steel in production does not mean 
that the President, rather than Congress, had the constitutional 
authority to act. "213 The Court, he explained, "cannot decide 
this case by determining which branch of government can deal 
most expeditiously with the present crisis. The answer must de-
pend on the allocation of powers under the Constitution."214 
Douglas added a powerful argument to support his conclusion 
that the president had no inherent power to effect the seizure: 
The President has no power to raise revenues. That power 
is in the Congress by Article I, section 8 of the Constitution. 
The President might seize and the Congress by subsequent ac-
tion might ratify the seizure. But until and unless Congress 
acted, no condemnation would be lawful. The branch of the 
government that has the power to pay compensation for a sei-
zure is the only one able to authorize a seizure or make lawful 
one that the President had effected. That seems to me to be 
the necessary result of the condemnation provision in the 
Fifth Amendment.215 
Justice Jackson's opinion, often viewed as the weightiest 
and most impressive of the concurring opinions, dealt a crushing 
blow to the doctrine of inherent executive power: 
The Solicitor General lastly grounds support of the seizure 
upon nebulous, inherent powers never expressly granted but 
said to have accrued to the office from the customs and claims 
of preceding administrations. The plea is for a resulting 
power to deal with a crisis or emergency according to the ne-
cessities of the case, the unarticulated assumption being that 
212. Id. at 602. 
213. Id. at 629. 
214. Id. at 630. 
215. Id. at 631-32 (citations omitted). 
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. k 1 216 necessity nows no aw. 
But as Justice Jackson pointed out, the Convention did not 
grant emergency powers to the president. The Framers recog-
nized, Jackson explained, "that emergency powers would tend to 
kindle emergencies. "217 Jackson, for one, was unwilling to 
amend the work of the Framers and lodge an emergency power 
in the executive. On the contrary, "emergency powers are con-
sistent with free government only when their control is lodged 
elsewhere than in the Executive who exercises them."218 The 
proposition that the president might exercise an inherent power 
was alarming: "[s]uch power," he wrote, "either has no begin-
ning or it has no end. If it exists, it need submit to no legal re-
straints. "219 As a consequence he joined Justice Black: "The Ex-
ecutive, except for recommendation and veto, has no legislative 
power. The executive action we have here originates in the indi-
vidual will of the President and represents an exercise of author-
ity without law."220 
Justice Jackson's denunciation of the inherent powers thesis 
included a rejection of the argument that the Vesting Clause is a 
"grant in bulk of all conceivable executive power .... " Rather, 
it is to be regarded "as an allocation to the presidential office of 
the generic powers thereafter stated,"221 a view that reflects the 
Framers' aim, as Madison explained, to "confine and define" ex-
ecutive power. Jackson's characterization of executive power 
might have caused him some slight embarrassment. As Attorney 
General he defended President Franklin D. Roosevelt's seizure 
of the North American Aviation Company in 1941, in part, on 
"the aggregate of Presidential powers. "222 When the Attorney 
General's argument was advanced in Youngstown by counsel for 
the government, Justice Jackson drew upon his renowned wit: 
216. Id. at 646. Jackson's opinion has been viewed as the most influential of the 
Court. See, e.g. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (Jackson's opinion 
"brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in" the 
area of national security jurisprudence). In his Foreword to Marcus, Truman and the 
Steel Seizure Case: The Limits of Presidential Power at xxi (cited in note12), Louis Fisher 
observed: "The part of Youngstown that has had the greatest impact on contemporary 
constitutional analysis is Justice Jackson's concurring opinion." 
217. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650. 
218. I d. at 652. 
219. Id. at 653. 
220. Id. at 655. 
221. Id. at 641. 
222. 89 Cong. Rec. 3993 (1943). In Youngstown, Jackson stoutly maintained, how-
ever, that Roosevelt's action was "regarded as an execution of congressional policy." 343 
U.S. at 649 n.l7. 
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"a judge cannot accept self-serving press statements of the attor-
ney for one of the interested parties as authority in answering a 
constitutional question, even if the advocate was himself. "223 
Justice Jackson's rejection of the doctrine of inherent pow-
ers marked in his mind an obvious conceptual distinction be-
tween that discredited theory and his understanding of the fluid 
nature of presidential power, which he set forth in an influential 
analysis that has been embraced by jurists and scholars alike.224 
Jackson's essay, it is familiar, divided executive power into three 
categories: 
1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for 
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these 
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify 
the federal sovereignty. If his act is held unconstitutional un-
der these circumstances, it usually means that the Federal 
Government as an undivided whole lacks power. A seizure 
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress 
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the 
widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of 
persuasion would rest heavily upon any who might attack it. 
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congres-
sional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his 
own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in 
which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in 
which its distribution is uncertain. Therefore, congressional 
inertia, indifference or quiescence may sometimes, at least as 
a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures on inde-
pendent presidential responsibility. In this area, any actual 
test of power is likely to depend on the imperatives of events 
and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract 
theories of law. 
223. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added). 
224. See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) ("Justice Jackson 
summarized the pragmatic, flexible view of differentiated government power to which we 
are heir ... . ");Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 694 (1988) (citing Jackson's opinion fa-
vorably); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721-22 (1986) (giving favorable treatment. to 
Jackson's opinion); Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (observmg 
that in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,707 (1974), "the unanimous Court essentially 
embraced Mr. Justice Jackson's view, expressed in his concurrence in Youngstown."). 
Michael Glennon has observed: "Youngstown is remembered mostly for the concurring 
opinion of Justice Robert Jackson." Glennon, Constitutional Diplomacy at 10 (cited in 
note 3) 
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3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its low-
est ebb, for then he can rely only upon his own constitutional 
powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress over the 
matter. Courts can sustain exclusive presidential control in 
such a case only by disabling the Congress from acting upon 
the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclu-
sive and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what 
is at stake is the equilibrium established by our constitutional 
system.225 
207 
Justice Jackson's analysis led him to eliminate the seizure of 
the steel industry from the first two classifications. President 
Truman's act clearly did not fall within the first category, Jack-
son reasoned, because "it is conceded that no congressional au-
thorization exists for this seizure."226 Nor was it possible to sus-
tain the seizure under the "flexible tests" of the second category. 
Jackson explained that Congress had not "left seizure of private 
property an open field." Rather, it had "covered it by three 
statutory policies inconsistent with this seizure. "227 As a conse-
quence of congressional authority over the field, it followed that 
the seizure did not fall into the "zone of twilight"228 in which the 
president and Congress share authority or in which the alloca-
tion of power is uncertain.229 In fact, in terms that echoed Justice 
Black's opinion, Jackson rejected Truman's invasion of the legis-
lative realm: "The Executive, except for recommendation and 
veto, has no legislative power. The executive action we have 
225. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-38. 
226. Id. at 638. 
227. Id. at 639. The seizure was inconsistent, Jackson explained, with the Selective 
Service Act of 1948, § 18, 62 Stat. 625, 50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. N) § 468 (c); The Defense 
Production Act of 1950 § 201, 64 Stat. 799, amended, 65 Stat. 132,50 U.S.C. App. (Supp. 
IV)§ 2081. 
228. The origins of the familiar phrase, "zone of twilight," are obscure. It appears in 
a memo analyzing presidential power that was prepared for Attorney General Homer 
Cummings by Assistant Solicitor General Bell and Special Assistant Townsend, dated 
November 10, 1937 in The Papers of Robert H. Jackson, Library of Congress, Box 82. 
Roy E. Brownell II, The Coexistence of United States v. Curtiss-Wright and Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer in National Security Jurisprudence, 16 J. L. & Pol. 1, 45 n.170 
(2000), has located the use of the phrase in John A. Fairlie, Administrative Legislation, 18 
Mich. L. Rev. 181, 189 (1920): "Whatever the logical difficulties, the fact remains that 
there is a broad twilight zone between the field of what is distinctly and exclusively legis-
lative and what is necessarily executive in character; that courts have recognized [as] 'no 
man's land."' (emphasis added); (Supp. IV) § 2081; and the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act, 1947, §§ 206-210,61 Stat. 136, 155, 156,29 U.S.C. (Supp. IV)§§ 141, 176-180. 
229. Id. at 639. Jackson thus denied the existence of both a concurrent power of sei-
zure and an inherent presidential power to seize property. 
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here originates in the will of the President and represents an ex-
ercise of authority without law."230 
The seizure, then, fell into the third category. Since Truman 
had engaged in a measure that was "incompatible" with the will 
of Congress, it meant that the seizure could be upheld only if the 
Court determined that the president possessed constitutional au-
thority over seizure in the first place and then subtracted the leg-
islature's constitutional powers by "disabling the Congress from 
acting upon the subject."231 But Jackson denied the existence of 
a concurrent power in this area and reaffirmed the absence of 
presidential power over seizure by noting that the executive 
"possesses only delegated powers," the grant of which did not 
extend to the seizure of private property, and that he "does not 
enjoy unmentioned powers."232 
Justice Harold Burton wrote a concurring opinion in which 
he explained that the Constitution vests in Congress the author-
ity to handle national emergency strikes.233 Congress has exer-
cised its authority by establishing two procedures for dealing 
with such emergencies, but neither provided for seizure. Burton 
emphasized, with other members of the majority, that Congress 
had reserved to itself the authority to authorize a seizure in par-
ticular cases, and in the Taft-Hartley Act, it had effectively pro-
hibited the president from exercising a seizure power.234 "The 
foregoing circumstances," he stated, "distinguish this emergency 
from one in which Congress takes no action and outlines no gov-
ernment policy."235 He added: 
This brings us to a further crucial question. Does the Presi-
dent, in such a situation, have inherent constitutional power 
to seize private property which makes congressional action in 
relation thereto unnecessary? We find no such power avail-
able to him under the present circumstances. The present 
situation is not comparable to that of an imminent invasion or 
threatened attack. We do not face the issue of what might be 
the President's constitutional power to meet such catastrophic 
230. Id. at 655. 
231. I d. at 637-38. 
232. Id. at 640. The Framers, wrote Jackson, decried the concept of unlimited 
power: "The example of such unlimited executive power that must have mo~t impress~d 
the forefathers was the prerogative exercised by George III, and the descnpt10n of 1ts 
evils in the Declaration of Independence leads me to doubt that they were creating their 
new Executive in his image." Id. at 641. 
233. Id. at 656. 
234. I d. at 657. 
235. Id. at 659. 
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catastrophic situations. Nor is it claimed that the current sei-
zure is in the nature of a military command addressed by the 
President, as Commander-in-Chief, to a mobilized nation 
waging, or imminently threatened with, total war.236 
209 
This issue of whether the president, as commander in chief, 
possesses the authority to respond to a sudden attack on the 
United States has never been in doubt. The Framers of the Con-
stitution anticipated that the president would indeed "repel inva-
sions" of the country.237 In any event, Justice Burton concluded 
that since Congress had reserved to itself the right to decide 
when a seizure should be effectuated, Truman's action violated 
the principle of separation of powers.238 
Justice Tom Clark wrote a concurring opinion which repre-
sented a response to an issue that was brought before the Court, 
but also, strangely enough, an answer to a question that was not 
put to the Court. Clark stated: 
I conclude that where Congress has laid down specific proce-
dures to deal with the type of crisis confronting the President, 
he must follow those procedures in meeting the crisis; but that 
in the absence of such action by Congress, the President's in-
dependent power to act depends upon the gravity of the situa-
tion confronting the nation. I cannot sustain the seizure in 
question because ... Congress had prescribed methods to be 
followed by the President in meeting the emergency at 
hand.239 
Clark's willingness to exalt congressional authority at the ex-
pense of an assertion of inherent executive power provides 
common ground with the other concurring Justices. But the is-
sue of an unaided presidential power-the authority to act in the 
absence of legislation-was not an issue that was raised in 
Youngstown. Indeed, as we have observed, all six members of 
the majority, including Justice Clark, agreed that Congress had 
enacted legislation that effectively prohibited a presidential sei-
zure property, and that the legislation controlled the executive. 
Perhaps Clark had in mind the rough proposition that the presi-
dent enjoyed a concurrent power to act in a crisis, although Con-
gress might preempt executive action by occupying the field. 
236. Id. 
237. See generally Fisher, Presidential War Power at 9-12 (cited in note 2); Adler, 
Warmaking at 8-13 (cited in note 3). 
238. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 660. 
239. ld. at 662. 
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Justice Clark sought support in Chief Justice Marshall's opinion 
in 1804, in Little v. Barreme,240 in which Marshall ruled that 
President John Adams' order to commanders of public vessels to 
seize American vessels bound to or sailing from the French Re-
public violated the Nonintercourse Act of February 9, 1799, 
which limited presidential seizure powers, to ships sailing to the 
French Republic.241 In his opinion, Marshall wrote: 
It is by no means clear that the president of the United States, 
whose high duty it is to 'take care that the laws be faithfully 
executed,' and who is commander in chief of the armies and 
navies of the United States, might not, without any special au-
thority for that purpose, in the then existing state of things, 
have empowered the officers commanding the armed vessels 
of the United States, to seize and send into port for adjudica-
tion, American vessels which were forfeited by being engaged 
in this illicit commerce?42 
Justice Clark viewed Marshall's statement as an acknowl-
edgment that the president enjoys with Congress a concurrent 
power, albeit one that must yield to congressional legislation. 
Justice Clark wrote: 
In my view-taught me not only by the decision of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in Little v. Barreme, but also by a score of other 
pronouncements of distinguished members of this bench-the 
Constitution does grant to the President extensive authority 
in times of grave and imperative national emergency .... I 
cannot sustain the seizure in question because here, as in Lit-
tle v. Barreme, Congress had prescribed methods to be fol-
lowed by the President in meeting the emergency at hand. 243 
But Chief Justice Marshall made no mention of either a 
concurrent or emergency power in Barreme. It seems very clear 
that Marshall's reference to "the then existing state of things" 
was a reference to the other statutes that had been passed by 
Congress in the limited war with France. All Marshall said was 
that it was conceivable, but not at all certain, that in the absence 
of a statutory prohibition in the context of war, the president 
might have the authority to seize an American ship sailing from 
a French harbor. 
240. 6 U.S. at 177-78. 
241. See the discussion in Fisher, Presidential War Power at 17-20 (cited in note 2). 
242. Little, 6 U.S. at 177. 
243. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 662. 
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In his concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter was emphatic 
in his belief that the Court should limit its discussion to the pre-
cise issue before it, and avoid generalizations and hypotheses 
about the scope of presidential power. This was wise counsel. 
The proposition that dicta are often unreliable because they 
raise problems and issues to which the court may not have given 
sufficient attention seems vindicated by Justice Clark's opinion. 
Frankfurter wrote: 
The issue before us can be met, and therefore should be, 
without attempting to define the President's powers compre-
hensively. I shall not attempt to delineate what belongs to 
[the Chief Executive] by virtue of his office beyond the power 
even of Congress to contract; what authority belongs to him 
until Congress acts; what kind of problems may be dealt with 
either by the Congress or by the President or both, ... what 
power must be exercised by the Congress and cannot be dele-
gated to the President. It is as unprofitable to lump together 
in an undiscriminating hotch-potch past presidential actions 
claimed to be derived from occupanc~ of the office, as it is to 
conjure up hypothetical future cases.2 
CONCLUSION 
The Framers' subordination of the executive to the principle 
of the rule of law represented a signal achievement in the devel-
opment of constitutional government. The maintenance of that 
principle, long the challenge of constitutionalism, may be 
charged to the president, in the spirit of self-restraint, and to 
Congress, in the spirit of the need for checks and balances. But 
it falls to the Court, too, in the performance of its duty, as 
charged by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, to say 
what the law is.245 The challenge to the judiciary to restrain the 
president through its interpretation of words on parchment is 
not always an altogether promising prospect. Many factors may 
impose themselves and preclude a satisfactory resolution in a 
case of executive excess: judicial philosophies of restraint, parti-
sanship and friendship, loyalty, and a judfle's affinity for presi-
dential policies and goals, among others.24 In Ex parte Milligan, 
244. Id. at 597 
245. 5 u.s. 177 (1803). 
246. See, generally, Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Judicial Strategy (U. of Chicago 
Press, 1964); Cornell W. Clayton and Howard Gillman, eds., Supreme Court Decision-
Making: New Institutionalist Approaches (U. of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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Justice David Davis, a close personal friend of President Lin-
coln, authored an opinion which held Lincoln's actions unconsti-
tutional. The maintenance of the rule of law was critical, for 
"[w]icked men, ambitious of power, with hatred of liberty and 
contempt of law, may fill the place once occupied by Washington 
and Lincoln."247 
The Youngstown Court, staffed with close personal friends 
of President Truman, surely felt the stress and strain inherent in 
the conflict between their affection and admiration for the for-
mer haberdasher from Missouri and their duty to declare the 
president's seizure of the steel industry unconstitutional.248 But 
the Court's repudiation of a presidential claim to an inherent 
emergency power proved a powerful reaffirmation of executive 
amenability to the judicial process, and provided a weighty and 
respected precedent for future courts to draw upon in restraining 
broad assertions of executive power.249 
The status of the rule of law has never been particularly se-
cure. Crises, real or imagined, have been adduced as justifica-
tion for executive ~owers and governmental encroachment on 
rights and liberties. 50 Emergencies, moreover, have diminished 
public concern about compliance with constitutional norms, and 
perhaps it is true that there is a correlation between a lapse in 
public scrutiny and constitutional corruption. In an era marked 
by clamor, conflict and terrorism, including attacks on the 
United States, and characterized by governmental reaction 
which, under the auspices of a temporary energy response,251 re-
247. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 125 (1866). 
248. Justice Douglas referred to Truman as "a kindly President," 343 U.S. at 633; 
and Justice Frankfurter expressed his admiration for Truman when he stated: "it is ab-
surd to see a dictator in a representative product of the sturdy democratic traditions of 
the Mississippi Valley." Id. at 593-94. Frankfurter lamented the task of declaring that 
Truman had exceeded his authority: "It is not a pleasant judicial duty to find that the 
President has exceeded his powers and still less so when his purposes were dictated by 
concern for the Nations's well-being, in the assured conviction that he acted to avert 
danger." Id. at 614. 
249. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. 713; Nixon, 418 U.S. 683. 
250. See generally, Paul L. Murphy, The Constitution in Crisis Times, 1918-1969 
(Harper & Row, 1972). 
251. In the wake of the September 11, 2001 attack on the United States, President 
George W. Bush came to wield powers not exercised by a president since Abraham Lin-
coln occupied the White House. The tremendous concentration of power in the presi-
dent is one part usurpation and two parts abdication. Congress passed the "Authoriza-
tion for Use of Military Force" Resolution, which essentially delegated the war power to 
the president, in defiance of the Constitution and the delegation doctrine. Pub. L. No. 
107-40, 50 U.S.C. 1541 (2001). Congressional abdication of the war power has become a 
commonplace. On October 8, 2001, President Bush issued an executive order to create a 
"Homeland Security Office," a cabinet-level position to which he immediately appointed 
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suits in a virtually unlimited concentration of power in the presi-
dent, the future of the rule of law may be in doubt.252 In our 
time, we would do well to recall Justice Frankfurter's admoni-
tion in Youngstown: "The accretion of dangerous power does 
not come in a day. It does come, however slowly, from the gen-
erative force of unchecked disregard of the restrictions that 
fence in even the most disinterested assertion of authority. "253 
Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge. Bush's creation of an office constituted a rank 
usurpation of the legislative power, and the appointment of Governor Ridge, without 
Senate approval, violated the Appointment Clause of Article II. For discussion of these 
points and the general overgrown nature of the presidency, see David Gray Adler, The 
Condition of the Presidency: Clinton in Context, in Adler and Genovese, eds., The Presi-
dency and the Law: The Clinton Legacy at 175-92 (cited in note 4). Justice Jackson's de-
rision of swollen executive powers is relevant to our time: "[a]nd if we seek instruction 
from our own times, we can match it only from the executive powers in these govern-
ments we disparagingly describe as totalitarian." Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 641. 
252. Justice Jackson spoke derisively of "temporary" emergency measures. In com-
menting on the Framers' refusal to clothe the president with emergency powers, Jackson 
stated: 
I do not think we rightfully may so amend their work, and, if we could, I am not 
convinced it would be wise to do so, although many modern nations have forth-
rightly recognized that war and economic crises may upset the normal balance 
between liberty and authority. Their experience with emergency powers may 
not be irrelevant to the argument here that we should say that the Executive, of 
his own violation, can invest himself with undefined emergency powers. 
Germany, after the First World War, framed the Weimar Constitution, de-
signed to secure her liberties in the Western tradition. However, the President 
of the Republic, without concurrence of the Reichstag, was empowered tempo-
rarily to suspend any or all individual rights if public safety and order were seri-
ously disturbed or endangered. This proved a temptation to every government, 
whatever its shade of opinion, and in 13 years suspension of rights was invoked 
on more than 250 occasions. Finally, Hitler persuaded President Von Hinden-
berg to suspend all such rights, and they were never restored. 
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 650-51. 
253. I d. at 594. 
